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CIVIL PROCEDURE
M. MINNETrE MASSEY*
INTRODUCTION
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure should be a means and not an end.
Would that lawyers might be induced to refrain from making
procedure an end in itself! Would that judges and publishers
might be induced to stop publishing opinions on horrible examples
of "waste motion in the legal process"! Would, too, that law
teachers (like myself) might be induced to refrain from comment-
ing on such examples! All of these seem vain hopes in our day, as
hundreds of decisions pour forth each year dealing with procedural
problems, many fascinating, some foolish. Reporting cases in this
area can be dangerous because of what Chief Judge Charles E. Clark
calls a "Gresham's Law" of procedure, whence bad precedents tend
to drive out the good.'
This article surveys the more important and interesting cases, amend-
ments to the rules and legislative acts which have occurred during the
period. 2 The format follows that of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first major division is Actions at Law and Suits in Equity. [Prior
to the discussion of the rules and their judicial interpretation, there
are contained in this division sections on Statutory Process and Notice
Requirements and on Venue.3] The other major divisions are Actions at
Law Only, and Suits in Equity.
If it were necessary to offer one sweeping conclusion or suggestion it
would be: READ THE RULES! Too many cases need never have been
decided if the Bar, yes, and even the Bench, would heed this admonition.
The outline of the Suney is as follows:
I. LAW AND EQUITY
A. Statutory Process and Notice Requirements
B. Venue
C. Commencement of Action
* Assistant Dean of the School of Law, Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Peterfreund, Civil Practice, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1563 (1959).
2. Cases reported in the Southern Reporter 112 So.2d through 131 So.2d; comments,
where appropriate, are included on more recent amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure (1954), contained in later opinions of the Florida Supreme Court.
3. Carey A. Randall, Executive Editor of the U. MIAMI LAw REV., contributed
these sections.
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D. Private Agreements or Consents
E. Extending Time
F. Pleadings
C. Pretrial Conference- Surveillance Films and
Order of Modification
H. Parties
I. Dismissal of Actions
J. Depositions and Discovery
K. Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment
L. Relief from Judgment, Decrees or Orders
M. Transfers of Actions Erroneously Begun
II. ACTIONS AT LAW ONLY
A. Jury Trial-Waiver
B. Jury Instructions
C. Directed Verdict
D. New Trial
III. EQUITY SUITS ONLY
A. Class Actions
B. When Cause at Issue
C. Interpleader
D. Masters
E. Rehearing
F. Injunctions
I. ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY
A. Statutory Process and Notice Requirements
1. NEVER ON A SUNDAY
"Under the common law, Sundays are dies non juridices-non judicial
days-and the offices of the court are not open on these days."4  The
statutes contain a provision allowing service or execution on Sunday which is
in derogation of the common law and is strictly construed.6 In the absence
4. Harden v. Harden, 125 So.2d 124, 125 (Fla. App. 1960). Under the commonlaw the period of time included within the prohibition of judicial proceedings on Sunday
is from sunrise to sunset. Harrison v. Bay Shore Dev. Co., 92 Fla. 875, 111 So. 128 (1926).
5. FLA. STAT. § 47.46 (1961).
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of a showing of compliance with the requirements of the statute necessary
to the validity of service of process on Sunday such service is void.6
Cases involving problems relating to process are classified under a
variety of headnotes and are easily overlooked in a review of the reporters.
Classifications were found under Sunday, Associations, Automobiles, Cor-
porations, Divorce, Infants, International Law, Landlord and Tenant, Limi-
tation of Actions, Mental Health, Partnership, and occasionally under Process.
The table of statutes construed appears to be the most reliable source.
2. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON MINORS AND INCOMPETENTS
The statutes controlling service of process on minors7 and incompe-
tents8 are strictly construed and the requirements of the statutes should be
literally followed. An original summons named as defendants a widower
and his minor children., The return of the sheriff with respect to service of
process showed that no type of service was made upon the minor children. It
was held that the attempted service was inadequate to bring the minor
children within the jurisdiction of the court.9 The defect was not cured
by the filing of an answer by the guardian ad litem. The failure of the
court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a minor defendant, where
the record does not show any prejudice to his rights or result in a miscar-
riage of justice, is not fatal to the court's jurisdiction. 10
The delivery of a summons to the father of an incompetent, residing
in the same residence as the incompetent, was held not to be good service."
Mitchell v. Brown1 2 is a case of first impression with regard to service of
process on an incompetent person. The plaintiff contended that the sheriff's
costs showed that only one copy of the summons was served although there
were two defendants in the case, one an incompetent in the care or custody
of the other. The court concluded that the sheriff's cost bill was not a part
of the service and that it could be ignored. A sheriff's return is presumed
to be valid, and clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome the
statements contained in the return. The court further noted that the real
purpose of service of process is to give a defendant notice that a legal
6. 125 So.2d at 125.
7. FLA. STAT. § 47.23 (1961). "The courts of this state shall obtain jurisdiction
of minors when the original writ of subpoena in chancery or summons in common law
actions, as the case may be, is served by reading the writ or summons to be served to the
minor to be served, and also to the guardian or other person in whose care or custody such
minor may be, or by a delivery of a copy thereof to such minor and to his guardian or other
person in whose care or custody such minor may be, and by further serving the writ or
summons upon the guardian ad litem thereafter appointed by the court to represent said
minor ...."
8. FLA. STAT. § 47.25 (1961).
9. Foster v. Thomas, 112 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).
10. Brown v. Ripley, 119 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1960).
11. Drake v. Wimbourne, 112 So.2d 27 (Fla. App. 1959).
12. 114 So.2d 178 (Fla. App. 1959), quashed, 119 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1960).
1962]
594 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proceeding has been instituted against him and to afford him the oppor-
tunity to defend against it. When the co-defendant received notice of the
action pending against the incompetent, service of another copy upon
her would have given her no additional notice or information and the service
was held to be good in spite of the failure to serve an additional copy. 18
The supreme court failed to agree with the district court of appeal and
quashed the decision. 14  "Strict construction will not permit ignoring the
requirement of service on the incompetent in addition to service on the
one having him in custody. The service on both suggests duplication but
it is a duplication commanded by the law."'15
3. NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS
A personal injury suit was brought, against a nonresident of Florida
and service of process effected under the nonresident motorists statute. 16
The defendant was a resident of Texas and the injury occurred in Florida.
The complaint did not allege that the defendant was either a resident or
a nonresident of Florida at the time of the injury. Held, the statute permits
service on the Secretary of State as to a nonresident who is charged with
negligent injury in an automobile accident in Florida either while a non-
resident or after changing a Florida residence at the time of the injury to
nonresidence at time of suit and service.' 7 The court pointed out that
Red Top Cab 6 Baggage Co. v. Holt 8 was not controlling since that case
was decided under an earlier statute,'9 which by its terms applied only to
persons who were nonresidents at the time of the injury.
It is not necessary to allege the legal relationship between the owner
and the driver in order to determine whether the complaint states facts suf-
ficient to make the alleged owner amenable to service of process under the
nonresident motorist statute.20 The same case held that though a nonresi-
dent motorist was a minor at the time of the automobile accident in Florida,
service of process on him in accordance with the statute was sufficient
without complying with the requirements of the Florida statute2' for.service
of process on a minor.22
A registered letter sent to the defendant and subsequently returned
marked "unclaimed" is not the equivalent of a refusal to accept the letter.2
13. Id. at 183.
14. Brown v. Mitchell, 119 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1960).
15. Id. at 387.
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 47.29, .30 (1961).
17. Howland v. Bevis, 276 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1960).
18. 154 Fla. 77, 16 So.2d 649 (1944).
19. FLA. STAT. § 47.30 (1941).
20. Culver v. Tucker, 182 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Fla. 1960).
21. FLA. STAT. § 47.23 (1961).
22. 182 F. Supp. at 387.
23. Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 So.2d 745 (Fla. App. 1960).
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The fact that the defendant did not claim the letter is susceptible not only
to the inference that he refused to do so, but is also susceptible to the
inference that he did not then live at the address to which the letter was
directed. It appears that had the letter been sent special delivery the result
in the case may have been different and would have been controlled by
Cherry v. Heffernan.2 4
The statute for substituted service on nonresident motorists is also in
derogation of the common law and is strictly construed. The forwarding
to a nonresident defendant motorist of copies of summons before it was
served on the Secretary of State, with no notice as to the fact of the service,
is not a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement of "notice
of such service" of process on the Secretary of State.2
4. SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
The word "address" and the word "residence" are not synonymous
within the contemplation of the statute26 providing for constructive service
of process.27 In another action service was by publication against a par-
ticular named defendant as having an unknown place of residence, and if
dead on his unknown heirs. A subsequent investigation extending over a
period of months revealed that the party in question was dead and resulted
in locating his heirs in another state. ,The court held that the lower court
erred in rejecting the service by publication, which was otherwise regular.28
"5. PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
The retired partner of a Pennsylvania partnership, living in Florida, was
served personally in Florida. The return showed an inability to locate the
other partner, presumably living in Pennsylvania. The partnership was not
doing business in Florida. The court held the service to be good on the
partner served, and that a judgment could be entered and enforced against
the individual assets of the partner who was served although it would not
bind the assets of any partner not served.2 9  The court pointed out that
the statutes provide:
24. 132 Fla. 386, 182 So. 427 (1938). "The purpose of the Act was to give the
classes named therein notice of any action brought against them that they might submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and offer such defense as they may be advised.
It is shown here that the terms of the Act in so far as giving notice was required were
complied with to the letter. If defendant chooses to flout the notice and refuse to accept
it, he will not be permitted to say in the next breath that he has not been, served." Id. at
391, 182 So. at 429. In Cherry the letter was returned marked "refused."
25. Conway v. Spence, 119 So.2d 426 (Fla. App. 1960).
26. FLA. STAT. § 48.04(3) (1961).
27. Wilmott v. Wilmott, 119 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1960).
28. Munro v. Bechard, 132 So.2d 429 (Fla. App. 1961).
29. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Homan, 116 So.2d 444 (Fla. App. 1959).
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When any original process is sued out against several persons com-
posing a mercantile or other firm, the service of said process on any
one member of said firm shall be as valid as if served upon each
individual member thereof; and the plaintiff may, after service upon
any one member as aforesaid, proceed to judgment and execution
against them all.a0
There is no special statutory prerequisite for service of process upon a part-
nership that it be engaged in business within the state.3 1
An unincorporated voluntary association is essentially different from a
co-partnership and does not come within the purview of the statute providing
for service of process with respect to a co-partnership of several persons
composing a mercantile or other firm.A2 The common law rule for making
effective service on a voluntary association must be pursued and the members
served individually.
6. CORPORATIONS AND PERSONS DOING BUSINESS
The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington3 held that the defendant, if he be not present within the forum,
should have certain minimum contacts with it in order for substituted service
upon him to come within the purview of the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.3 4 the Court
still relied upon the "substantial connection" rule. Florida statutes33 provide
for service of process upon nonresidents engaged in doing business within the
state. The interpretation of the terms of the statute is difficult and each
case seems to be resolved upon the basis of the facts in the particular case,
Florida going as far towards upholding service of process as the Supreme
Court opinions will permit.
The sale by a nonresident owner, through Florida agents, and on terms
negotiated within the State of Florida, of a tract of Florida real estate, and
the taking back of a recorded purchase money mortgage and installment
note designating a Florida bank as collection agent, does not constitute a
"business or business venture" within the meaning of the statutes.8 6 A
corporation shipping goods in interstate commerce to a single customer, who
is not a broker, jobber, wholesaler or distributor, from a point outside the
state, is not engaged in carrying on a business or business venture.87
30. FLA. STAT. § 47.15 (1961).
31. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Homan, 116 So.2d 444 (Fla. App. 1959).
32. Florio v. State, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. App. 1960).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16, .161, .17, .171, .30 (1961).
36. Toffel v. Baugher, 125 So.2d 321 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. discharged, 133 So.2d
420 (Fla. 1961).
37. Newark Ladder & Bracket Co. v. Eadie, 125 So.2d 915 (Fla. App. 1961).
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Nonresidents, to whom the plaintiffs had conveyed land within the
state allegedly as security for a usurious loan, which could, under an option
contract, be repaid with over one hundred per cent interest in the form of
repurchase of the land, were held to be engaged in a business venture in the
state sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction over them as nonresidents.3 8
The term business venture is generally applied to one subject matter
or undertaking while the term business is broader in scope denoting a variety
of subjects, transactions or undertakings.3 9 A general course of employment
and the conduct or carrying on of personal business activity in the state
for pecuniary benefit or livelihood is properly classified as carrying on a
business.4 0
In Zirin v. Charles Pfizer 6' Co.41 there was evidence that agents of the
defendant, which was a foreign corporation, were employed solely to go into
drugstores, doctors' offices, and hospitals, and to talk about the defendant's
products. If orders were tendered to the agents they would forward the
orders to the defendant's home office. The district court of appeal held that
the defendant was not transacting business within the state within the
meaning of the statute.42  Justice Carroll dissented, in a well reasoned
opinion which developed all of the evidence and found the decision clearly
contrary to the weight of the evidence. 43  The supreme court agreed with
Justice Carroll and adopted the dissent as the view of the court.44  The
court pointed out that it is
quite apparent that the purpose of Section 47.171 ... is to liber-
alize the scope of the operation of Section 47.17 and provide for
the service of process upon any agent of a foreign corporation
doing business for it in this State .... 45
7. LEGISLATION
Only minor legislative changes were made in the statutory provisions
regulating service of process during the 1961 session. Provision was made
for the designation of persons within state agencies upon whom service
of process may be made. 46
38. Oxley v. Zmistowski, 128 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 1961).
39. Matthews v. Matthews, 122 So.2d 571 (Fla. App. 1960).
40. Id. at 573.
41. 121 So.2d 694 (Fla. App. 1960), aff'd, 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961). The court
affirmed the decision below since the plaintiff below failed to make it appear that the cause
of action upon which he sued was one which arose out of the activities of the foreign
corporation within the state. The court concluded that the reasons assigned by the trial
court and the court of appeal were erroneous. 128 So.2d at 600.
42. Id. at 695.
43. Ibid.
44. 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
45. Id. at 599.
46. FLA. STAT. § 120.071 (1961). "Each agency shall designate a person within
1962]
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B. Venue
Florida's principal venue statute4 7 provides that an action may be com-
menced in the county where (1) the defendant resides, (2) the cause of
action 'accrued, or (3) where the property in litigation is located. Simple
as the statute may seem it nevertheless gives rise to considerable litigation
and must be considered in connection with other sections of the statutes
governing venue.
1. CONTRACTS CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY
The plaintiff-vendor filed a complaint and good faith affidavit in the
Circuit Court of Manatee County, seeking specific performance of a contract
for the sale of realty located in Manatee County. The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the residence of the parties and
the transaction giving rise to the action were both situated in Pinellas County.
Upon a denial of the motion, an interlocutory appeal was taken. The
district court considered the action for specific performance to be in per-
sonam and transitory and reversed.48 Venue here was determined by the
nature of the principal relief sought and the court ignored the question as
to whether the location of the property in litigation should control and
followed the common law rule as to transitory actions.49
Lessors entered into a written lease of motel property located in Brow-
ard County. The lessee filed suit in Dade County seeking a decree declaring
the lease to be breached and terminated. The defendant-lessors moved to
dismiss for improper venue, contending for the privilege to be sued in the
county of their residence. The motion was supported by an affidavit assert-
ing that defendants were residents of Broward County. The lessee, on
appeal, contended that because the defendants were residing in Dade County
at the time the cause of action accrued, it was immaterial where they resided
at the time the suit was filed. The court rejected the contention and held
that the venue statute applies as of the time of the filing of the suit and
not as of the time of the accrual of the cause of action. 50 The court com-
mented that the cause of action accrued where the act of default occurred,
which was in Broward County. The suit here was also considered to be'
in personam and the location of the property was not controlling.
the agency upon whom service of process may be served. The name and address of such
person shall be filed with the secretary of state. If the person's name is not so filed,
service of process may be had on the agency by serving the secretary of state in the name
of the agency concerned."
47. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1961).
48. McMullen v. McMullen 122 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1960).
49. For criticism of the case see 15 U. MIAMi L. REv. 332 (1961).
50. Gates v. Stucco Corp., 112 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1959).
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2. DEFENDANTS RESIDING IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES
The plaintiff is afforded a choice of venue in actions against two or
more defendants residing in different counties.51 An accident occurred in
St. Lucie County involving two defendants who were residents of that county
and a third defendant who was a resident of Broward County. The plain-
tiff brought his action in Broward County and the trial court dismissed
his complaint against the St. Lucie residents, stating that "It would impede
the administration of justice to have the case tried here . -52 In reversing,
the district court pointed out that the inconvenience of maintaining the
action cannot be used as a vehicle upon which to negate the plaintiff's choice.
3. SUITS AGAINST STATE AGENCIES
A state agency with headquarters at the seat of government, has the
privilege of demanding that suit be brought against it there, in any situation
primarily involving a construction of the rules or regulations of the agency. 5
While the question is more a matter of historic policy it may have been
elevated to a rule of law. The same rule may well apply to appellate pro-
ceedings although most of the cases have involved cases of original juris-
diction. The privilege can be waived by the agency.54 An action against
the state comptroller was dismissed since it could only be maintained against
him in Leon County "unless he waived the privilege or unless some attempt
to seize and sell property . . . has been actually initiated in the county
where the suit is brought." 55
4. VENUE IN CAUSES OF ACTION GROWING OUT OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A domestic corporation brought suit in Volusia County against a foreign
corporation, obtaining jurisdiction by service of process on a resident agent
in Lake County. The complaint included two counts, the first for refusal
to pay bills for work performed and the second, in the exact amount as
in count one, in general assumpsit for labor and materials furnished. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of
improper venue. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the cause of
action accrued in Volusia County since the contract provided no place of
payment and it would be implied that payment was to be made where the
payee resided or had an established place of business.56 In the view of one
justice, under the first count it was reasonable to infer that the payments
51. FLA. STAT. § 46.02 (1961).
52. Doonan v. Poole, 114 So.2d 504, 505 (Fla. App. 1959).
53. Star Employment Serv., Inc. v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 122 So.2d 174
(Fla. 1960).
54. Id. at 177.
55. Green v. Bob Lourie Films, Inc., 133 So.2d 431, 432 (Fla. App. 1961).
56. M. A. Kite Co. v. A. C. Samford, Inc., 130 So.2d 99 (Fla. App. 1961).
19621
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
were to be made in Alabama. The count in general assumpsit did not
allege the contract under count one and therefore showed nothing to rebut
the inference that payment was to be made where the payee resided.5 7
Plaintiff instituted suit in Dade County on a promissory note executed
and payable in Dade County. Defendants filed motions to dismiss alleging
that Broward County was the proper venue for the action. After the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, the defendants filed affidavits showing
that both were residents of Broward County. The plaintiff had not filed
the good faith affidavit called for under the statute. 8 In affirming the trial
judge's order, the district court pointed out that the only matters before the
court when the order was entered was the plaintiff's complaint and the
defendants' motions, none of which affirmatively disclosed that the defend-
ants were residents of Broward County. 9 The court also pointed out that
the filing of the good faith affidavit was directory and not jurisdictional
and the plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable time within which to comply.
5. CORPORATIONS- DOING BUSINESS
A domestic corporation may be sued in any county where it maintains
a branch office for the transaction of any substantial part of its customary
business.6 0 Plaintiff brought suit in Leon County against a publishing
company whose principal place of business was located in Hillsborough
County. The defendant maintained a staff representative at the capitol
to report news events but did not maintain an office. The reporter utilized
office space furnished free of charge by the state. The court held that the
transaction of its customary business from a fixed location to such an extent
that it is actually present there, and had such a responsible agent as would
presumptively bring home to it notice of a summons served upon him,
satisfies the venue requirements of the statute.61
57. Id. at 102. Sturgis, J. dissented in a well reasoned opinion and viewed the
complaint as a whole as demonstrating lack of venue. Id. at 102. The importance of con-
sidering FLA. STAT. §§ 46.03 and .04 "in pari materia" is demonstrated by the concurring
opinion.
58. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1961).
59. Superior Elec. Indus. v. Franklin Acceptance Corp., 130 So.2d 116 (Fla. App.1961).
60. Tribune Co. v. Approved Personnel, Inc., 115 So.2d 170 (Fla. App. 1959). For
subsequent history see 121 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. App. 1960) in which Sturgis, J. dissented
with an opinion pointing out the fundamental error permeating this and the former appeal:
"The statute governing service of process upon corporations (F.S. § 47.17, F.S.A.), which
is not involved on these appeals, has been confused and inaccurately intertwined with F.S.
§ 46.04, F.S.A., governing venue in suits against corporations."
61. 115 So.2d 170. Sturgis, J. dissented stating that "I am persuaded that the
primary legislative intefit, as it relates to domestic corporations, was to narrow the venue
of suits brought against them, and thus relieve them of the burdensome expense, inconveni-
ence, annoyance, and--quite likely-prejudicial aspects of defending actions that are
arbitrarily filed, as in this case, in a fonm where the cause of action did not accrue, in
which no property involved is located, and where defendant does not reside-a forum that
has no logical connection whatever with the parties or the subject matter of the litigation."
Id. at 176.
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Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act6 2 the plaintiff may place
the venue where the defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, or
where the defendant is doing business at the time the action is commenced. 63
When the action is in a federal court, a defendant may obtain a transfer
of the action under the principle of forum non conveniens. 64 Florida courts
recognize the principle of forum non conveniens 65 and will decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction when the facts in the case justify. The courts refuse to
apply the doctrine where intrastate change of venue is sought on a forum
non conveniens rationale.66
The provision that a foreign corporation doing business within the
state may be sued where it has an agent or other representative does not
unduly discriminate against the foreign corporation and is constitutional.6 7
A nonresident corporation, which does not have an agent in Florida and does
not do any business within the state, which is served under the nonresident
motorists statute68 may be sued in any county where the court can secure
jurisdiction of the defendant.6 9
6. - LEGISLATION
A statute was enacted during the 1961 session of the legislature pro-
viding for change of venue for the guardianship of incompetents whenever
the domicile of the incompetent is changed to another county.70 No other
statutory provisions affecting venue were enacted.
C. Commencement of Action
1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A civil action, excepting ancillary proceedings, is commenced when the
complaint is filed.71 Further, the statute of limitations is tolled by the filing
of the complaint. 72
The case of Dibble v. Jensen73 presents an interesting application of
the Florida rule. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident by
62. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
63. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ganey, 125 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1960), 15 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 420 (1961).
64. 125 So.2d at 578. The transfer may be made under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1958).
65. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Homan, 116 So.2d 444 (Fla. App. 1959).
66. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Caney, 125 So.2d 576 (Fla. App. 1960); Hollywood
Memorial Park, Inc. v. Rosart, 124 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1960); Greyhound Corp. v.
Rosart, 124 So.2d 708 (Fla. App. 1960).
67. Greyhound Corp. v. Rosart, 124 So.2d 708 (Fla. App. 1960).
68. FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1961).
69. Hollywood Memorial Park, Inc. v. Rosart, 124 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1960).
70. FLA. STAT. § 744.11(4) (1961).
71. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.2(a).
72. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So.2d 767, 769 (Fla. 1959).
73. Dibble v. Jensen, 129 So.2d 162 (Fla. App. 1961).
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the defendant,7 4 then a Florida resident. Subsequently, the defendant
became a resident of New Jersey. The plaintiff failed to bring the action
during the time the defendant was a resident of Florida and he argued
that the defendant's absence from the state tolled the statute of limitations. 75
The defendant argued that the statute was not tolled inasmuch as service
could have been obtained during her absence from the state under the
Florida nonresident motor vehicle statute. The court in its opinion did
not discuss either of these two contentions.7 6 The court simply stated that
the action was barred because the plaintiff failed to comply with the Florida
rules and case law requiring the filing of a complaint to toll the statute of
limitations. The plaintiff also contended that the filing of the complaint
was not required in this case because service of process could not be had.
The court, in affirming the judgment for the defendant, reiterated that you
must file the complaint to toll the statute of limitations and that perfecting
service of process is not necessary to commence the action and toll the statute.
It is possible that a Florida court may follow the lead of some, federal
courts"7 in requiring compliance with the rules providing for the filing of the
complaint78 and the forthwith issuance of-summons, delivered for service, 9
in order to toll the statute of limitations.
2. FAILURE TO MAKE PROOF OF SERVICE NOT FATAL
A district court of appeal held that the original summons, with the
sheriff's notation of service thereon, must be returned to the court of
issuance in order to give jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.80
The supreme court quashed the decision and reiterated that it is the service
of the summons and not its filing or that of the sheriff's return which
gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant."' This principle is incor-
porated in the Florida rule which provides that "failure to make proof of
service shall not affect the validity of service."82 The better procedure for
the plaintiff to follow would be to proceed anew to obtain personal service
of a defendant who remains within the jurisdiction of the court, or if the
defendant has left the state and is amenable to substituted service to proceed
accordingly. In the absence of such a statutory provision for substituted
74. We are only concerned with the nonresident defendant in this case.
75. Supra note 73; FLA. STAT. § 95.07 (1961).
76. FLA. STAT. § 95.07 (1961) appears to be applicable only to residents of the
state; for the application of FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1961) to residents of the state who remove
themselves from the state see text at note 17 supra.
77. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[4.-3-2], at 785 n.5 (2d ed. 1961).
78. FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.2(a).
79. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(b).
80. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 110 So.2d 685 (Fla. App.), quashed, 116 So.2d 767 (Fla.
1959), 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 238 (1959).
81. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So.2d 767 (Fla. 1959).
82. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.3(c).
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service, the trial judge in his discretion could re-establish the lost summons
and return proof thereof.83  In such a circumstance the proof should be
almost conclusive and such as to leave little, if any, doubt as to its authen-
ticity. In addition, it would appear that the statutory provision for re-es-
tablishment of process is also available.8 4 This is not to say that the court
has jurisdiction to proceed in the cause prior to the time the original sum-
mons was returned and filed, showing proper service on the defendant."
In reversing a circuit court's post decretal order, which denied the defend-
ant's motion to vacate and set aside a final decree of divorce, it was held
that even though the court had jurisdiction over the defendant's person by
reason of the personal service of process upon him, a decree pro confesso
and a final decree entered prior to the time the original summons was
returned and filed were not authorized. The original summons was not
filed in the cause until long after entry of final decree.86
3. AMENDING RETURN OF SERVICE
The Second District Court of Appeal has held that a chancellor has
authority to entertain proceedings to amend a sheriff's return to state the
truth as allegedly revealed in the deposition of the deputy sheriff who had
served the challenged process seventeen years before.87
4. ADDITIONAL SUMMONS
Although Florida Rule 1.3(d) 88 may be modeled after Federal Rule
4(a), it fails to provide that "upon request of the plaintiff separate or
additional summons shall issue against any defendants."89  The question
thus arises as to the power of the trial court to issue additional summons.
In Marine Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Green9" the trial court granted leave to
have a second alias (pluries) summons issued, after two previous attempts
at service had been unsuccessful because the parties served had no connec-
tion with the defendant. Each time the defendant had moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter and insufficiency of service of process. Each time the court had
granted the motion because of lack of service of process and granted leave
to the plaintiff to have another summons issued. Judge D. Carroll, speaking
for the majority, held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
83. 116 So.2d at 770.
84. FLA. STAT. § 71.13 (1961).
85. 116 So.2d at 769.
86. Wilmott v. Wilmott, 119 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. App. 1960).
87. Mitchell v. Brown, 128 So.2d 8 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133 So.2d 321
(Fla. 1961).
88. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(d).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a). (Emphasis added.)
90. 114 So.2d 710 (Fla. App. 1959).
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granting leave of the plaintiff to have an additional summons issued, after
two previous attempts at service had been unsuccessful. 9 The defendant
must sustain the burden of submitting evidence showing that there was
little or no likelihood that the defendant could be served either in the near
or distant future.92 The concurring opinion, which challenged the juris-
diction to entertain the appeal, contended that the matter was not discre-
tionary and the trial court could not have entered a contrary order.93
D. Private Agreements or Consents
During the survey period, Florida attorneys have demonstrated a dis-
regard for Rule 1.5(d) .94 This rule simply provides that no private agree-
ment or consent between parties or their attorneys in respect to the pro-
ceedings in a cause shall be of any force before the court. The rule further
provides for two methods of receiving recognition for agreements. Written
agreements will be recognized if subscribed by the party or his attorney
against whom it is alleged. Parol agreements will be recognized if made
before the court, and promptly made a part of the record, or incorporated
in the stenographic notes of the proceedings. 95
The appellate courts have held private agreements not in writing as to
venue,96 settlement figures,9 7 and stipulations between parties98 to be inef-
fective as not complying with the rule.
E. Extending Time
With three exceptions, 9 a court has wide discretion in the granting of
time extensions. °00 For example, in McWhorter v. McWhorter'0° the court
held that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant an
additional stay of the proceedings, due to the disappearance of a party,
at the expiration of a prior six months' stay.
91. Id. at 711.
92. Accord, Over 30 Ass'n v. Blatt, 118 So.2d 71 (Fla. App. 1960) (defendant sus-
tains the burden of proof). Contra, 114 So.2d 710, 714 (dissenting opinion of Wiggin-
ton, J.).
93. Sturgis, J., concurring, pointed out that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(d) and 1.11(b)prohibited dismissal of the complaint. 114 So.2d at 712.
94. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.5(d).
95. Cooke v. Cooke, 126 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1961). The trial judge has the
additional discretion to require parol agreements to be reduced to writing.
96. Gates v. Stucco Corp., 112 So.2d 36 (Fla. App. 1959).
97. Spencer v. Florida-Georgia Tractor Co., 114 So.2d 466 (Fla. App. 1959).
98. Cooke v. Cooke, supra note 95.
99. The exceptions are (1) motion for directed verdict, (2) motion for new
trial, and (3) extending the time for taking an appeal.
100. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.6(b).
101. 122 So.2d 504 (Fla. App. 1960).
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F. Pleadings
I. PLEADINGS REQUIRED OR ALLOWED
The pleadings which are allowed are a complaint, an answer, a reply
if the answer contains a counterclaim denominated as such and an answer
to a cross-claim. 10 2 Averments in a pleading to which no responsive plead-
ing is required or permitted are deemed denied or avoided, and an adverse
party may assert at trial any defense thereto.10 3 No other pleading is allowed,
except that the court may order a reply to an answer. 04
In Dickerson v. Orange State Oil Co. 05 the defendant's answer alleged
the affirmative defense of release. Although the plaintiffs sought and
obtained "authorization" to file a reply to this defense, no reply was filed.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was precluded from
questioning the validity of the release by failing to reply. The court held,
in this regard
that when a party is required to reply to an answer, because the
answer contains a counterclaim or cross-claim or because he is
ordered to reply by the court, he must set forth the affirmative
defense. If the answer does not contain a counterclaim or cross-
claim, however, and the court does not require a reply to the
answer, such affirmative defenses are not to be pleaded by the
plaintiff and he is entitled to raise and present them at trial without
having placed them in a reply or other pleading. The fact that the
court authorized the plaintiff to reply did not require that he
do so.106
The court evidently felt that there was a difference between an order
of the court and an authorization of the court.
2. THE COMPLAINT
In an action to foreclose a laborer's lien in which a decree pro confesso
and final decree were entered, the defendant sought on appeal to challenge
the sufficiency of the complaint. 0 7 It was held that the sufficiency of the
complaint, after a decree pro confesso had been entered, could be tested
on appeal from the final decree. It was also held that a portion of the
complaint may have been lacking in particulars, but in the absence of a
timely attack it was sufficient, after decree pro confesso, to sustain the entry
102. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a), as amended by 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
103. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(e).
104. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b); Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp., 99 So.2d
272, 276 (Fla. 1957).
105. 123 So.2d 562 (Fla. App. 1960).
106. Id. at 569.
107. Wallace Bros. v. Yates, 117 So.2d 202 (Fla. App. 1960).
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of a final decree. The court found substantial compliance with Rule
1.8(b), 108 the pertinent portion of which reads: "It [the complaint] shall
set forth a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts on which the
pleader relies, and if it informs the defendant of the nature of the cause
against him, it shall be held sufficient."' 0 9
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of realty,
summary decree was granted for the defendants on the ground of laches." 0
The chancellor did not commit harmful error in denying the plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint to seek rescission in the alternative. The complaint
should have been considered as one praying for general relief and an amend-
ment of the prayer for relief was not necessary to obtain the substantive
relief to which the claimant was entitled to plead and to prove. Therefore
the cause was remanded and the chancellor directed to determine, without
formal amendment, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the return of
his deposit."1
a. Pleading Special Matters
i. Capacity
The capacity, authority, or legal existence of a party for purposes of
suit is not in dispute in the great bulk of cases. The rules 12 simplify
pleading and proof thereon by providing that an averment of such matters
is not necessary, except to show jurisdiction. Specific negative averment
is necessary to raise the issue of capacity and failure to do so results in
waiver of the defense."18
In a slip and fall case"14 where the plaintiff died prior to trial and the
court, upon motion, authorized the substitution of his administratrix as
plaintiff, the defendant was not at the close of plaintiff's case entitled to a
directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff failed to introduce docu-
mentary proof of her capacity as administratrix. No negative averment as
to plaintiff's alleged lack of capacity to sue had been asserted by the
defendant and it was presumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that
the court followed the rule and that the order of substitution was made
upon a proper showing."'
A wrongful death action brought by the executrix was consolidated for
trial with another action brought by the dependent mother of the decedent.
The trial judge's granting of the defendant's motion for new trial was
108. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
109. Ibid.
110. Shirley v. Lake Butler Corp., 123 So.2d 267 (Fla. App. 1960).
111. See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.62, at 1207 (2d ed. 1953).
112. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9.
113. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(a).
114. Shelboume Enterprises, Inc. v. Last, 129 So.2d 430, 431 (Fla. App. 1961).
115. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.19.
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affirmed on appeal. The order of priority of the Florida Wrongful Death
Statute'1 6 precludes the suit by the executrix in the presence of a suit by
the decedent's mother. The defendant's failure to raise lack of capacity
by defensive pleading prior to trial and the failure to question the executrix's
right to maintain the action until after judgment had been entered did not
constitute such waiver of the right to object as would preclude the granting
of defendant's motion for new trial. Evidently capacity under the wrongful
death statute is jurisdictional, thus non-waiveable. 11 7
ii. Fraud
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be pleaded with particularity. 18  Vhat constitutes
sufficient particularity is difficult to define. The answer as to whether the
rule has been complied with depends upon the facts of each case. 19
iii. Special Damages
Items of general damage need not be pleaded with particularity, but
items of special damages must be specifically stated. 120  Special damages,
as defined by the Florida Supreme Court, are considered to be the natural
but not the necessary result of an alleged wrong or breach of contract. Such
damages do not follow by implication of law upon proof of breach or
wrong.12' In an action to enjoin an alleged nuisance which plaintiffs
claimed was occasioned by the defendant's operation of a supermarket adja-
cent to their property, damages for personal inconvenience and discomfort
were special in nature and had to be specifically stated. 22
3. DEFENSES
a. Raising Affirmative Defenses by Motion
The Florida courts continue to hold that affirmative defenses must be
raised by answer and not by motion to dismiss, unless the complaint clearly
shows by its allegation that the relief sought has been barred.' 23  Res
judicata, estoppel by judgment or equitable estoppel are not defenses
available by motion. Such defenses cannot be asserted by allegation of facts
stated in motion, nor can they be established by introduction of extrinsic
evidence at the hearing thereon.' 24
116. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01, .02 (1961).
117. Birdsong v. Hendry, 128 So.2d 404 (Fla. App. 1961).
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(b).
119. See generally, Horne v. Sewell, 118 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1960); Bouis v.
Warren, 112 So.2d 283 (Fla. App. 1959).
120. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.9(g).
121. Augustine v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956).
122 A. & P. Food Stores, Inc. v. Kornstein, 121 So.2d 701 (Fla. App. 1960).
123. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d); Nunez v. Alford, 117 So.2d 208 (Fla. App. 1960).
124. Nunez v. Alford, supra note 123.
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b. Affirmative Defenses Deemed Denied or Avoided
Generally pleadings are limited to a complaint, an answer, and a reply
only if the answer contains a counterclaim or cross-claim.' 25 The court may
order or "authorize" a reply to an answer.120  In an action brought by a
Swiss corporation against a Florida resident on a promissory note made by
the defendant in France the defendant pleaded the affirmative defense of
the French Statute of Limitations. 12 The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, the judgment for
the defendant was reversed. The majority of the court opined that no
responsive pleading (reply) is required to rebut an affirmative defense,
and, therefore, any facts which would tend to defeat the affirmative defense
are available to the plaintiff at trial.
In a suit to foreclose three mortgages the defendants answered, pleading
usury.' 28 (The content of the answer was a conclusion of law and not
ultimate facts.)' 29 The trial judge erroneously held that the answer was a
compulsory counterclaim and by the plaintiff's failure to respond he
admitted usury. An affirmative defense requires no responsive pleading.
c. Erroneous Designation of an Affirmative Defense
.In an action on a note the defendant's answer erroneously asserted the
defense of want of consideration in the counterclaim. 30  The rules provide:
"When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim, or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so require, shall
treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation."131 Therefore,
the defense was entitled to be treated as though it had been properly set
forth. The appellate court, in reversing the trial court, held that this defense
of want of consideration was adequately pleaded even though the answer was
not sworn to, nor did the statute require. 13 2
125. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a).
126. Ibid. See also Dickerson v. Orange State Oil Co., 123 So.2d 562 (Fla. App.
1960).
127. Courtlandt Corp. v. Whitmer, 121 So.2d 57, 58 (Fla. App. 1960).
128. American Nat'l Growers Corp. v. Harris, 120 So.2d 212 (Fla. App. 1960).
129. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b) requires that a pleader allege "ultimate facts" upon
which he relies.
130. Mayflower, Inc. v. Suskind, 112 So.2d 394 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 115 So.2d
416 (Fla. 1959).
131. FLA. R. Civ P. 1.8(d).
132. FLA. STAT. § 52.08 (1961) provides that in a suit on a promissory note the
plaintiff need not prove the consideration as part of his affirmative case unless the same
is impeached by the defendant under oath. The court held that this did not preclude
the defendant from assuming the burden of proof and pleading want of consideration
as an affirmative defense, a pleading not under oath.
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d. Stricken Defense Waived Where Defendant Did
Not Avail Himself of the Right to Amend
The defendants appealed from an adverse final decree in a debtor's
action on an alleged usurious contract. One of the points raised on appeal
was that the trial court erred in refusing the defendants the right to interpose
and prove the defense of unclean bands. The lower court struck the defense
"presumably as having been insufficiently set forth"; leave was given to
amend the answer. On appeal it was held that since the record showed no
such amendment was filed, the issue of unclean hands was waived. 133 True
the defendants waived the right to restate this defense, but if the defendants
assigned the striking of this defense as error,134 further amendment to the
answer was not necessary. They had the right of review on appeal as to
the sufficiency of the defense as they asserted it.
e. Unpleaded Affirmative Defense in Hearing on
Summary Judgment
Affirmative defenses not raised in a pleading to a preceding pleading
are deemed waived. 133 Notwithstanding a plain reading of the rules, the
Florida courts' interpretation of the rule, and the admonition to attorneys
in the last Survey article, once again a party has attempted to raise and
argue an affirmative defense in a hearing on a summary judgment without
raising the defense in his answer. The case concerned a claim for a real
estate commission wherein the defendant answered denying that the plain-
tiff's salesman was entitled to the commission. At the summary judgment
hearing the defendant raised the unpleaded defense of dual agency. Held,
that summary judgment for the defendant was improper when based upon
an affirmative defense which had not been raised by answer, as it was beyond
the scope of the issues raised by pleadings.1 3, 6
f. Unpleaded Affirmative Defenses Supported by
Unobjected to Evidence at Trial
The courts have consistently required that affirmative defenses must
be raised in the pleadings. The rules provide, in effect, that failure to so
plead results in a waiver. In Garrett v. Oak Hall Club,137 the suprdme court
pointed out that where a defendant had failed to affirmatively plead the
133. Kay v. Amendola, 129 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla. App. 1961).
134. There is no indication in the case as to whether the striking of the defense
was or was not assigned as error.
135. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b), 1.11(h). .
136. Lewis v. Tyner, 125 So.2d 328 (Fla. App. 1960).
137. 118 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1960).
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defense of laches, it was nevertheless proper for a chancellor to render a
decree for a defendant at the final hearing where testimony was offered,
and not objected to, proving said defenses. The plaintiffs did not claim
surprise or prejudice as a result of the ruling of the trial court which was
held to have been based on proof of the issue of laches, or that if afforded
an opportunity they could have traversed that issue. Formal amendment,
though preferred, is not mandatory.138
g. Time When Presented
The defendant's answer and counterclaim in a quiet title suit were
filed five years after they were due.139 Upon plaintiff's failure to reply to
the counterclaim the defendant filed a motion for decree pro confesso.
Much to the defendant's chagrin, a decree pro confesso for the plaintiff
was entered by the clerk because the defendants had failed to file and
serve a timely answer. Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the decree pro
confesso - to strike the untimely answer and counterclaim. 40 The defend-
ant then moved to strike this latter motion. On hearing, plaintiff's motion
was granted and the court allowed the defendant ten days in which to file a
petition to intervene.' 4 ' The interlocutory appeal which was taken by the
defendant was dismissed as the defendant could not show harmful error.
The appellate court pointed out that after the time provided by the rules142
for filing of the answer and counterclaim has expired, such pleadings may
not thereafter be interposed unless leave of court is first obtained. 143 In
the present case, such leave had been neither sought nor obtained, therefore
the trial court did not err in striking the answer and counterclaim.
At this stage of the proceedings it would seem appropriate for defendant
to motion the court, showing excusable neglect and seek permission to file
his answer and counterclaim. 44 The burden of showing that the failure
was "the result of excusable neglect" falls upon the defendant. Of course,
the court may in its discretion grant or deny this motion. 45
h. Deferred Hearing on Defenses Raised by Motion
The hearing and determination of defenses, which may be asserted by
138. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b) provides for amendments to conform to the evidence.
139. Campbell v. North Fla. Loan Ass'n, 116 So.2d 484 (Fla. App. 1959).
140. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff moved to strike the decree pro
confesso entered in his favor. As unusual as it may be, the defendant on appeal argued
that the lower court erred in setting aside the decree pro confesso entered against him.
Evidently, the opinion does not relate the entire course of the litigation.
141. The appellate court did not discuss the propriety of the lower court's order
allowing the defendant 10 days for permission to intervene.
142. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(a).
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.6(b)(2). This rule requires a showing of excusable neglect.
144. Ibid.
145. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.08, at 1481 (2d ed. 1961).
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motion,'14 6 may, in the court's discretion, be deferred until the time of
trial."47 The merits of such defenses, not having been ruled upon below,
are not reviewable in an interlocutory appeal taken from an order of court
sitting in chancery, which reserves ruling until final hearing. 148
i. Consolidation and Waiver of Defenses
A defendant may join all defenses available, which may be presented by
motion, in one motion.149 If a defendant does not employ motion practice,
he may prescnt his defense along with affirmative defenses in his answer.15 °
A defendant who files a motion which questions the jurisdiction of the
court over his person does not waive such objection by coupling it with other
motions which are addressed to the merits of the cause.151
The appellant-plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. The
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over his person. The
chancellor's order found the complaint defective as exhibits recited in the
complaint were absent. The plaintiff was given leave to amend and file his
exhibits and to make proper service of the amended complaint. The plain-
tiff complied with the order and the defendant filed a second motion to
dismiss, but he did not raise the question of lack of jurisdiction over his
person. The motion was denied and the defendant filed an answer and a
counterclaim. 52
Later the chancellor dissolved the mechanic's lien and transferred the
cause to the law side of the court. After transfer, the defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person. The motion was granted and
an appeal followed. Held, reversed; the defense was waived by not being
raised at the same time as the challenge to the merits was interposed to the
second amended complaint. In addition thereto defendant sought affirma-
tive relief via his counterclaim. The transfer gave no new right to object
to jurisdiction over the person.
It is to be noted that the defendant, employing motion practice, moved
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction
146. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b) enumerates seven defenses which may be raised by
motion.
147. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(d).
148. Plumbing Indus. Program, Inc. v. McCormick, 115 So.2d 708 (Fla. App.
1959). Whether the holding in this case would be applicable to interlocutory appeals
at law relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person is unknown. However, it is
submitted that logically the same result should occur.
149. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(g). "May" in this context means "must." See FLA.R. Civ. P. 1.11(b).
150. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(g).
151. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b), (g); Huffman v. Heagy, 122 So.2d 335 (Fla. App.
1960).
152. Visioneering Concrete Constr. Co. v. Rogers, 120 So.2d 644 (Fla. App. 1960).
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over his person. The opinion of the appellate court does not disclose the
disposition of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person.
Thus, there are two possible interpretations of the case:
(1) that the lower court ruled on the motion (2) that the lower court
failed to dispose of the motion.
It is possible to argue that the court implicitly ruled upon the motion
in favor of the defendant. However, if such was the case, then how could
the defendant waive this objection when he has had a ruling of the court?
Evidently this was not the case.
It must be assumed that the lower court felt no compulsion to rule
upon this objection because the complaint was to be dismissed on other
grounds (admittedly without prejudice). In all probability this was the
case. The problem then presented squarely to the court, was what must
an attorney do to maintain his objection to jurisdiction over the person
after the court has initially failed, refused or ignored it? The case could
well stand for the proposition that, a motion directed to a second amended
complaint must restate all defenses not expressly ruled upon or found in
a motion directed toward the complaint originally dismissed.
It should be noted that the appellate court pointed out that the defend-
ant took additional action not compatible with a motion directed to lack
of jurisdiction over the person. This dicta could most certainly be good
authority prior to the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. This
action of the defendant would then have been considered a common law
waiver (general appearance). The action that the appellate court com-
plained of was the request for affirmative relief (a counterclaim). The
Florida Rules specifically allow the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person to be made by motion or answer at the option of the pleader. If
indeed the pleader exercises his option, and raises the defense by answer,
certainly he can not have waived this ' objection if he, in addition, asks for
affirmative relief as required by the rules.
One possible reconciliation of the case is to assume that the equity
court took a third course of action, that they had rejected the defendant's
objection to jurisdiction. In such a case, the court would be eminently
correct in holding that the objection could not again be raised, merely because
the cause was transferred from the equity side of the court to the law side.
One further possibility remains. The defendant in this case was sued
twice. It could well be that the objection he now attempted to argue was
directed to the service of the second amended complaint. If such was the
case, then the appellate court correctly ruled that the defendant waived
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his objection by not joining it in his motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint. 153
An indispensable party, the state comptroller, not joined in a suit
for an injunction against a sheriff to prevent execution of the collection of
delinquent sales taxes due the comptroller, perfected an appeal from an
order which refused to vacate the final decree.154 On remand of the cause
an amendment was filed and served on the comptroller as a party defendant,
who then moved to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction over his person
since he had not originally been served with process nor with copy of the
original complaint. It was held that the comptroller by moving to vacate
the initial decree, by requesting further proceeding, and by appealing from
the denial thereof, had brought himself within the jurisdiction of the court. 55
j. Amendment of Answer to State Defense or Counterclaim
Though the rules require that a defense or counterclaim must be
asserted by a defendant-no later than the answer, the proviso must be read
in the light of the rules for amendment.'56  Illustrative is the case of
Chaachou v. Chaachou.157 The appellate court, in reversing the lower court,
held that the defendant in a divorce action pending nearly seven years should
be permitted to amend his answer to assert a counterclaim for divorce, even
though the motion was made a month before testimony was set to be taken.
After so much past delay, postponement would be no hardship when it is
deemed necessary "in the furtherance of justice."'158
4. COUNTERCLAIMS
A defendant must state in or with his answer any claim that he has
against the plaintiff which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. 159
In addition, a defendant has the right to assert at the time of serving his
answer any claim against plaintiff, within the jurisdiction of the court, which
does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the plaintiff's claim.
In a suit for an accounting the trial court struck a portion of the
defendant's counterclaim which sounded in tort for damages on account of
slander. If this part of the counterclaim were compulsory it would have
153. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b).
154. Green v. Hood, 98 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1957).
155. Green v. Hood, 120 So.2d 223 (Fla. App. 1960).
156. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(h); 2 NMOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 12.23, at 2327
(2d ed. 1961).
157. 118 So.2d 73 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 122 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1960).
158. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c).
159. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1); Sarkady v. McGuire, 113 So.2d 446 (Fla. App.
1959).
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to be pleaded even though the accounting is in chancery and the slander
is a legal claim. The appellate court stated that "at the least" the counter-
claim was permissive but even so the defendant had an absolute right to
assert it.160
The defendant was held to have the option of asserting claims against
the plaintiff which do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
and when exercised leave of court is not a prerequisite nor does the court
have any discretion to deny the pleading of a permissive counterclaim, save
for two situations.'' In reversing the lower court it was held "that defend-
ant had the right to file his counterclaim for slander, even though same was
legal, on the chancery side of the court where the complaint was for an
accounting."' 62  Since neither party had requested a jury trial as to the
legal counterclaim the chancellor in his discretion could try all issues without
distinction in one hearing or order separate trials' 6 3 The accounting phase
of the suit had been concluded without error; therefore, on remand a sep-
arate trial, held by the chancellor, was to be had and the entry of a final
decree should be deferred until the disposition of the counterclaim and the
result should be incorporated with the accounting determination.
a. Bringing in Additional Parties to a Counterclaim
or Cross-Claim
Where an additional party to a counterclaim or a cross-claim is sought
to be brought in 114 the counterclaimant or cross-claimant should serve and
file his pleadings and secure an order from the court.165 If the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the additional party it should dismiss
the cross-action.
In an action wherein certain claims of ownership of a boat were asserted,
the defendant answered and counterclaimed against the plaintiff and
filed a "cross-claim" against the appellant, an officer of the plaintiff's cor-
poration.' 0  The appellate court stated that the defendant also filed a
motion to join the appellant and the plaintiff's corporation as co-defendants
under the cross-action. The additional party, appellant, a nonresident of
Florida, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
No service had been made or attempted. On hearing the trial court granted
defendant's motion to bring in the additional party and denied the addi-
160. Jones-Mahoney Corp. v. C. A. Fielland, Inc., 114 So.2d 18 (Fla. App. 1959);
3 MoORE,, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.18, at 48 (2d ed. 1948).
161. F .A. R. Civ. P. 1.13(5), (6).
162. 114 Sn.2d at 20.
163. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(9).
164. FA. R. CIV. P. 1.13(8).
165. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTicE % 5.04, at 1333 (2d ed. 1961); 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.39, at 101 (2d ed. 1948).
166. Cournand v. Lucor Corp., 114 So.2d 733 (Fla. App. 1959).
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tional party's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
The trial judge's order reflected that he was well aware that service had
not as yet, and in fact, could not be perfected. Before issuing this order
the court, in accordance with the rule,1'6 7 should have ascertained whether
or not service could have been made. Subsequently the third party appeared
and moved to vacate the order, or in the alternative have the court rule
whether he would be immune from service of process if he appeared to
testify for the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and
declined to rule on the immunity question.
On appeal from the two orders, held, reversed; and that "upon recog-
nizing the lack of jurisdiction over the appellant ... the chancellor should
have dismissed the cross-bill unless the circumstances justified the chancellor
in his discretion to defer ruling on the motion until the trial of the original
proceeding." 1 8
An interesting situation occurs when one fails as the defendant in a
first suit to assert a counterclaim against the plaintiff and bring in an
additional party thereto. In Pesce v. Linaido6 9 a motorist sued the driver
and owner of the other vehicle for injuries received in an automobile col-
lision. The defendant's answer set up the affirmative defense that the
minor driver, in another action, had sued the plaintiff for negligently caus-
ing his injuries and the plaintiff had filed an answer but no counterclaim
in this cause as required. 70  The defendants also raised the affirmative
defenses of estoppel by judgment and res judicata. In the first suit a con-
fession judgment had been entered for the minor driver and had been
satisfied. In this suit the motorist's insurance carrier conducted the defense.
The court held that even though it was a friendly suit the rules of com-
pulsory counterclaim controlled and barred this action against the driver.
In the instant case summary judgment was also granted for the owner,
who though not a party to the first suit could have been made a party.171
The owner could not be held liable unless the driver were negligent.1 72
5. STRIKING SHAM, IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL PLEADINGS
The court has the power to strike and dismiss a cause where upon
167. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(8).
168. 114 So.2d at 736 referring to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(d). FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.13(8) provides that when additional parties are sought to be brought in the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants if jurisdiction of them can be obtained.
The appellate court's reference to 1.11(d) would appear not to be applicable to 1.13(8)
as the jurisdictional determination necessarily precedes the order permitting the additional
party.
169. 123 So.2d 747 (Fla. App. 1960), 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 447 (1961).
170. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(1).
171. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(8).
172. The dissenting judge stated that the civil court of record proceedings pursuant
to FIA. STAT. § 45.02 (1961) were in the nature of an approval of a settlement and not
subject to the compulsory counterclaim rule. 123 So.2d at 750.
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hearing it affirmatively appears by affidavit and testimony'7 5 that the plain-
tiff's allegations were a sham. 174  The court also has the power to strike
any pleading or part thereof which is scandalous, impertinent, irrelevant or
immaterial. 175
6. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course any time
before the responsive pleading is served. If no responsive pleading is per-
mitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar an amend-
ment may be made within twenty days. 170 After this time leave should be
freely given by the court at any time in the furtherance of justice. 177  In
the much litigated Chaachou v. Chaachou178 case, the appellate court held
that permission should be granted the defendant nearly seven years after
the commencement of the divorce action, to amend his answer to assert a
defense and a counterclaim.
If upon trial issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the express
or implied consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been
pleaded. 17 An interpretation and discretionary problem arises when counsel
objects on trial to issues not pleaded. In Klein v. Klein180 a wife sought
to have the court adopt a New York divorce decree, as modified, and to
enforce the same. The chancellor on final hearing refused to enforce the
decree on the ground of fraud. The defense of fraud had not been raised
in the answer and the plaintiff objected to the introduction of testimony.
The appellate court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the chan-
cellor under the authority of the rule. 8 1 However, in a law action the
appellate court found an abuse of the trial judge's discretion when the
amendment on trial changed the theory of recovery.'8 2  It is suggested that
the better practice is to permit the amendment even though it involves a
change in the nature of the cause of action, or the theory of the action, so
long as the opposing party has not been prejudiced in presenting his case.' 83
173. Though testimony is admissible upon a hearing to determine a motion to
strike on the grounds of sham, it appears that the Florida position may be that testimony.
is not admissible in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
Odgen Trucking Co. v. Heller Bros. & Co., 130 So.2d 295, 297 (Fla. App. 1961);
Fish Carburetor Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 125 So.2d 889, 894 (Fla. App. 1961).
174. Riddle Airline, Inc. v. Mann, 124 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1960).
175. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.14(c); Aitkins v. Atwood, 124 So.2d 31 (Fla. App. 1960).
176. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a).
177. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(e).
178. 118 So.2d 73 (Fla. App. 1960). See also Riddle Airlines, Inc. v. Mann, 124
So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1960).
179. Garrett v. Oak Hall Club, 118 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1960). See text at note
137 supra.
180. 113 So.2d 855 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 116 So.2d 773 (Fla. 1959).
181. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b).
182. Tucker v. Daugherty, 122 So.2d 230 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 878
(Fla. 1960).
183. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.13, at 843 (2d ed. 1948).
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G. Pretrial Conference -Surveillance Films and
Order of Modification
In a negligence action, in which the alleged injury was permanent in
nature, plaintiff's counsel knew that the defense had surveillance films of
the injured party. At the pretrial conference counsel moved and was
granted an order for production.184  On appeal, held, reversed; the trial
judge did not have authority to require production of surveillance movies
made of the injured party by the defendant. 185 To require the production
of an admitted work product of a party at pretrial would destroy the pos-
sible protection afforded such party by provision of Rule 1.28, Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure. 86 It is suggested that to protect from honest mistakes
that the judge at pretrial, or a party via interrogatories, be able to obtain
the names of impeaching witnesses, and if surveillance films have been taken
the date of the taking. Then prior to their use at trial the jury may be
excused and the films may be viewed by both parties.
In Sappington v. Town Properties, Inc.187 a salesman sought a com-
mission which a broker allegedly owed to him. The defendant denied that
the plaintiff had participated in the sale. The pretrial conference order
contained admissions made by the defendant, including the fact that the
plaintiff partially procured the sale. Counsel for the defense, on the day of
trial, moved to modify the pretrial order and to delete the admission.' 8
The trial judge granted the motion and gave plaintiff's counsel the option
of a continuance. Plaintiff declined the continuance, and on appeal from
an adverse judgment assigned as error the modification order. In affirm-
ing, the district court of appeal stated:
Although pretrial orders do control the subsequent course of action
of the case, the trial judge at his discretion may modify such pre-
trial orders, so as not to stultify the purpose of the trial, which
is to give justice to all parties before the court.189
H. Parties
1. NECESSITY OF GUARDIAN IN SUIT AGAINST AN INFANT
The defendant appealed from an adverse judgment in a bastardy pro-
ceeding. The defendant, a nineteen-year-old minor, self-supporting and
184. Plaintiff conceded that movies are not subject to production (FLA. R. CIv. P.
1.28) and that they would not be subject to production at any time if not intended for
use at trial.
185. Collier v. McKesson, 121 So.2d 673 (Fla. App. 1960).
186. Id. at 675.
187. 126 So.2d 906 (Fla. App. 1961).
188. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.20, at 1130 (2d ed. 1948).
189. 126 So.2d at 908.
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mature, was represented by competent counsel. Neither counsel nor the
trial judge considered the necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem. The
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was not assigned as error on appeal
and was first injected into the case in the appellant's brief. There was no
prejudice or miscarriage of justice as a result of this oversight. Even so,
the majority of the court on appeal vacated the judgment holding: "Fail-
ure to follow the rule of procedure here invoked' 90 is as restrictive upon
the power of the trial court to render a decree as where jurisdiction is
lacking."''1  The trial court was under a duty to comply with the manda-
tory language of the rule even though not requested to do so by counsel.
2. DROPPING PARTIES
Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal as to two of three defendants before
an answer or motion for summary judgment were interposed.9 2 The remain-
ing defendant answered. Plaintiff then sought dismissal without prejudice10 3
which was denied; leave was granted plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
The defendant answered the amended complaint, which had named it sole
defendant, and asserted a counterclaim against the plaintiff and a cross-
claim against the original co-defendants. A decree pro confesso and final
decree were entered on the cross-claim and the defendant prevailed on the
counterclaim. In reversing the chancellor for failure to set aside the
decree pro confesso and final decree against the appealing "co-defendant,"
the court held that the proper method for dropping parties is by motion. 9 4
The voluntary dismissal rule is not applicable to multiparty litigation where
some but not all defendants are sought to be dropped. 95 Since the plain-
tiff's amended complaint sought relief against only one defendant the court
lacked jurisdiction over the person to entertain the cross-claim. 96
3. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES - TRANSFER OF INTEREST
Death and incompetency and the necessary substitution thereunder
are distinguishable from the desirability of substitution following a transfer
of interest during the litigation. Substitution under the latter does not
affect substantive rights and may under some circumstances be unneces-
sary; the determination is discretionary. In a contract action testimony
during trial revealed that the plaintiff corporation had transferred its interest
in the contract claim in litigation. The plaintiff offered to substitute as
190. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.17(b).
191. Brown v. Ripley, 119 So.2d 712, 717 (Fla. App. 1960).
192. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1) (i).
193. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.35(a)(2).
194. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18.
195. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a) (1) (i); Shannon v. McBride, 105 So.2d 16 (Fla.
App. 1958).
196. Scott v. Permacrete, Inc., 124 So.2d 887 (Fla. App. 1960).
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party plaintiff the assignee. The trial court rejected the offer and granted
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff
had no interest in the claim sued upon. In reversing the final judgment
entered on the directed verdict, the court held that two alternatives are
presented where there is a transfer of interest pending trial. "The action
may be continued in the name of the original party, or the court may upon
application allow substitution of the transferee. ' 197  The trial court was
without discretion to terminate the action and enter adverse judgment on
the merits solely because the transfer occurred.
I. Dismissal of Actions
1. MULTIDEFENDANTS AND VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BY PLAINTIFF
Except in actions in replevin or proceedings wherein property has been
seized or is in the custody of the court,1 98 a plaintiff may abandon his suit
at any time without order of the court by filing a notice of dismissal before
service by the adverse party of an answer or a motion for summary judg-
ment.' 99 The problem arises in cases wherein multidefendants are being
sued and the plaintiff wishes to dismiss the lawsuit as to some but not
all of the defendants or in the case wherein one or more of the defendants
has answered and the plaintiff is now precluded from using notice dismis-
sal under the rule.
In Scott v. Permacrete, Inc.2 0 0 the court held that the voluntary dis-
missal by the plaintiff, notice dismissal, was available only as to an entire
action or controversy and the proper method of dropping parties is to
move and procure an order of court dismissing a complaint as to the desig-
nated defendant or defendants under Rule 1.18. Though notice dismissal
as to two of three defendants was not effectual to eliminate them from the
lawsuit, the court held that when the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
solely against the remaining third defendant the other two were deleted as
parties and no longer subject to the court's jurisdiction. Service by mail
of the cross-claim was ineffectual and the decree pro confesso and final
decree were nullities. The chancellor erred in refusing to vacate and set
aside the decree pro confesso and the final decree upon Scott's timely
motion seeking same. 20 1
197. Miami Airlines, Inc. v. Webb, 114 So.2d 361, 363 (Fla. App. 1959).
198. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1), as amended by 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962),
effective July 1, 1962.
199. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a)(1). This right is limited by the "two dismissal
rule." See Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, 96 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1957), 14 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 262 (1959).
200. 124 So.2d 887 (Fla. App. 1960).
201. Ibid. For cases construing comparable Federal Rule 41, see 5 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 41.02 (Supp. 1961, at 40 n.a.).
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The day before trial of a chancery suit, in which a jury trial was author-
ized, the plaintiff wired counsel stating she was ill in California and requested
a ninety day continuance. Prior to the jury being empaneled the plain-
tiff's counsel requested a voluntary non-suit 202 and defendant moved for a
dismissal with prejudice. The chancellor denied the former and granted the
latter, whereupon the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, held, affirmed; the
non-suit provision is generally applicable to lawsuits but even assuming it to
be applicable in this case the case was not "on trial." The court went on
to hold that a plaintiff in a chancery proceeding does not have an abso-
lute right to a dismissal of his action after the filing of the defendant's
answer or motion for summary judgment, whichever comes first; and, that
the chancellor had not abused his discretion in dismissing the case with
prejudice. 2 03
2. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
A dismissal for lack of prosecution under the statute20 4 has been held
not to constitute an adjudication on the merits under the rules20 5 so as to
bar a subsequent action. In Yinger v. Kasow2°6 the trial Judge granted a
summary judgment upon the theory that the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as the result of prior dismissal of said action
for lack of prosecution; the district Court reversed.
This is not to say or imply that the issue is foreclosed or resolved in
Florida. To the contrary the issue is questionable as the result of the
March 21st, 1962 amendment to the rules.20 7  In amending the rule on
involuntary dismissal, the court added: "For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute ...a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him. ' 20 8  The first sentence of this rule now parallels its
federal counterpart.20 9 Florida courts look to federal court interpretations
in cases of parallel rules.2 1 0 The federal courts bar the bringing of a subse-
quent action when the initial action was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
2 11
202. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1961).
203. Welgoss v. End, 112 So.2d 390 (Fla. App. 1959). The status of the non-suit
in Florida is left in doubt by the amending of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b) by 139 So.2d
129.. (Fla. .1962). The phrase "that nothing stated herein shall preclude a .non-suit from
being taken pursuant to any applicable statute" is omitted from the amended rule.
204. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1961).
205. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b).
206. 123 So.2d 758 (Fla. App. 1960).
207. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962), effective July 1, 1962.
208. Id. at 130.
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
210. Crump v. Gold House Restaurants, Inc., 96 So.2d 215, 218 (Fla. 1957);
Hammac v. Windham, 119 So.2d 822, 825 (Fla. App. 1960).
211. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.11[21, at 1036 (2d ed. 1948).
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3. MISUSED NOMENCLATURE NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR
On trial of a suit in the nature of a creditor's bill the defendant moved
for a "directed verdict" at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. The chan-
cellor granted this motion and the appeal was taken from the final decree
entered thereon. On appeal it was held that the plaintiffs failed to establish
a prima facie case 212 and that the misnamed motion 213 did not afford
reversible error. The effect is the same as had the proper motion for the
involuntary dismissal been made. 214
4. RIGHT OF DEFENDANTS TO PRESENT PROOF AFTER
MOTION DENIED
In prior equity practice a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence was not permitted unless the defendant elected to submit
the cause for entry of final judgment on the plaintiff's proof only.215 Under
the rules210 involuntary dismissal procedure is now the same for suits in
equity as in actions at law. Therefore a defendant in either equity or law
runs no risk of having his proof cut off if he fails on a motion to dismiss
at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. 217
5. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF
FACTS - RES JUDICATA
A plaintiff passenger instituted a suit to recover for personal injuries
under the guest statute.2 18 The trial court granted the defendant operator's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's original and amended complaint for failure
to state a cause of action. On appeal the dismissal was affirmed without
opinion.21 9  Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a second suit on. the
same occurrence and alleged facts with respect to the issue of gross negli-
gence which were not presented in either of the complaints filed in the
first suit. The defendant moved for, and was granted, a summary judgment
based upon the defense of res judicata, as pleaded in his answer.
212. Nelson v. Cravero Constructors, Inc., 117 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 1960). The
plaintiff attempted to assert a statute in support of his complaint for the first time on
appeal. The appellate court refused to consider its application as it was not present at the
lower court.
213. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(a) is applicable solely to actions at law. For a comparison
of the federal counterpart of 2.7(a) and 1.35(b) see 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
41.1313], at 1043 (2d ed. 1948).
214. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b).
215. In re Estate of Mollard v. Austin, 101 So.2d 880 (Fla. App. 1957).
216. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b).
217. Janczewski v. Janczewski, 114 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1959). This decision is
in conflict with In re Estate of Mollard, supra note 215. See also Abernathy v. Gruppo,
119 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1960).
218. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1961).
219. Hammac v. Windham, 108 So.2d 328 (Fla. App. 1959).
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In affirming the court held that under Rule 1.35(b) the final judgment
based upon an order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint (or counter-
claim) for failure to state a cause of action is a final adjudication on the
merits, and will bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action between
the same parties unless it affirmatively appears from the order of dismissal
that it is made without prejudice.220
The court rejected the reasoning of the Kautzmann v. James case 221
on the ground that the supreme court did not consider Rule 1.35(b) in
reaching its conclusion. Mr. Justice Sebring speaking for the court in
Kautzmann stated:
As to when a final judgment on demurrer is conclusive on the
merits, the test is: Does the insufficiency of the complaint relate
to the facts alleged or to the allegation of the facts. If the defect
is in the facts affirmatively set forth, the judgment is upon the
merits; if there is merely an insufficiency in the allegations, the
judgment is not conclusive on the merits. 222
The Restatement of Judgments is in accord with this position.223
J. Depositions and Discovery
1. NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS
A plaintiff appealed from an adverse decree rendered in his divorce
suit. He urged that the defendant's notice of taking of the depositions
was defective because the reason for taking was not recited. The notice
was for depositions pending the action and the reason for taking is not one
of the elements of notice required. 224 If the deposition is one to perpetuate
testimony either before action or pending appeal then the notice must
recite the reasons therefor.22'
2. USE OF DEPOSITIONS
One of the two assignments of error, on appeal from an adverse judg-
ment in a personal injury action, was that the trial court erred in refusing
to allow rebuttal evidence by the plaintiff in the form of a deposition.
220. Hammac v. Windham, 119 So.2d 822 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 122 So.2d
408 (Fla. 1960).
221. 66 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1953). See also Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867(1909).
222. 66 So.2d at 38.
223. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §' 50 (1942). See also 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
§ 747 (5th ed. 1925).
224. Vecsey v. Vecsey, 115 So.2d 719 (Fla. App. 1959).
225. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.22. Rule 1.32 had a similar requirement, but depositions de
bene esse are abolished. In re Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P., 131 So.2d 475, 476(Fla. 1961), effective October 1, 1961.
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Allegedly, the deposition would have refuted the defendant's testimony that
she had stopped for a stop sign at the collision intersection. In affirm-
ing,22 6 the court held that the evidence should have been part of the
plaintiff's case-in-chief. In addition, there was no showing that the
deponent, a resident of the county of suit, was unable to appear in person
as a witness at the trial. 227
In a workmen's compensation proceeding, the deputy commissioner
requested the New York Compensation Board to take the testimony of
a claimant and other witnesses. The appellate court found no authority in
the discovery rules for a court to order depositions taken on its own motion.
The Workmen's Compensation Law 228 relating to depositions gave no
authority to request a New York board to take testimony for use in a
Florida proceeding. 229
3. DISPUTE AS TO WAIVER OF SIGNING
The rules230 require that when a deposition is transcribed it shall be
submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him
unless waived; the deposition shall then be signed by the witness unless
by stipulation the signing is waived, or the witness is ill, or cannot be found
or refuses to sign. If a dispute arises as to the signing of the deposition
the controversy is determined by the judge and not by the jury.2 31 It is
suggested that errors and irregularities in the manner in which the deposition
is signed are waived unless a motion is made with reasonable promptness.2 32
4. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY - "WORK PRODUCT"
a. Adverse Parties' Experts
The decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 233 and its Florida prototypes, 23 4
did not settle the question as to the right of a party to take the deposition of,
or inquire into reports prepared by an expert engaged by, or in the employ
of, the adverse party. The federal authorities are divided on the question
of the extent, type and circumstances wherein pretrial examination of expert
witnesses is available.
235
226. Driscoll v. Morris, 114 So.2d 314 (Fla. App. 1959).
227. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.21(d)(3).
228. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1961).
229. Paul Smith Constr. Co. v. Pitts, 114 So.2d 417 (Fla. App. 1959).
230. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.24(e).
231. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ganz, 119 So.2d 319 (Fla. App. 1960).
232. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.24(e) must be read in conjunction with Rule 1.26(d).
4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 30.20, at 2053, 32.01, at 2202 (2d ed. 1950). See
also FLA. ArT'Y GEN. Op. 060-113 (July 6, 1960).
233. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
234. Miami Transit Co. v. Hurns, 46 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1950); Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. v. Allen, 40 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1949).
235. 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 652, at 118
.(1961); 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24, at 1152 (2d ed. 1950)..
1962]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW- REVIEW
Florida district courts of appeal, in this regard, had prohibited a land-
owner in an eminent domain proceeding from requiring the condemnor to
produce for inspection and examination 286 all surveys, appraisals and related
matter which reflected the valuation of the defendant's land. The court
was of the opinion that the information sought was "work product" and
the information was as readily available to the landowner as it was to the
condemnor.23 T  Subsequently, this reasoning was followed to prohibit a
landowner from taking the deposition 23 8 of three appraisers, two of whom
were court appointed. One of the two court appointed appraisers, as well
as the third appraiser, was employed as an expert by the condemnor. It was
held that the work product doctrine protected the road department in
the absence of a showing that the interests of justice would be thwarted
by refusal of discovery and that the information sought was not available
to the defendant from some other source.2 89
The above-mentioned State Road Department cases were followed in
Ford Motor Co. v. Havee240 which held that good cause had not been
shown for the production of the defendant's experts' reports. In this per-
sonal injury action against the automobile manufacturer it was alleged that
the accident occurred because of a defective rod. The defendant's motion
for production 241 of the tie rod was granted and after thirty days possession
the rod was returned to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, on plaintiff's motion, the
trial court ordered production of a copy of a report of the examiners. The
appellate court held that the plaintiff did not show that the withholding
of the information sought would defeat the interest of justice or that such
information sought was not readily available to the plaintiffs; the work
product doctrine applied. The result of the case might have been avoided
if the trial court had appointed an expert whose findings would have been
available to both parties.24 2
Subsequently, and without the intended coverage of this Survey, the
supreme court quashed the district court of appeal holding which applied
the "work product" to eminent domain proceedings.2 43 It held that the
district court of appeal did not have jurisdiction to review by certiorari the
236. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
237. The court recognized that a different point from that in Hickman v. Taylor
was presented but determined that the same logic controlled. State Road Dep't v. Shell,
122 So.2d 215, 217 (Fla. App. 1960), rev'd, 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961). See also
Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of An Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (1962).
238. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.24.
239. State Road Dep't v. Cline, 122 So.2d 827 (Fla. App. 1960).
240. 123 So.2d 572 (Fla. App. 1960).
241. There was a question whether the inspection arose under FLA. R. CIv.
P. 1.28 or 1.29. The court found it immaterial as the expert was court appointed and
the "work product" doctrine applied in this case under either rule.
242. 123 So.2d at 575 n.2, 576 n.4; 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24, at 1152(2d ed. 1950).
243. Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
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interlocutory order at law which required production of surveys, appraisals,
and related matter which reflected the valuation of the defendant's land
in that the circuit court order was not a departure from essential requirements
of law. As the opinion relates to discovery the court said that the "work
product" immunity did not apply in eminent domain proceedings because
(1) the constitutional mandate makes it incumbent upon the taker to
award "just" compensation for the taking and the awarding of compensa-
tion which is "just" should be the care of the condemning authority as well
as that of the party whose land is being taken;244 (2) it is unfair to put the
unlimited resources of government against a condemnee-taxpayer who in
fact contributes to the government's unlimited resources; and (3) disclosure
may lead to the "speedy and inexpensive determination" of the case.245
5. MOTION TO PRODUCE
a. Timeliness
After the chancellor entered a decree reducing alimony payments, which
had been provided for in a final divorce decree, the former wife was unable
to sustain a motion to produce income tax returns as no action was "pend-
ing." 246  In addition thereto, the court pointed out that the motion was
defective in that it did not contain an allegation of good cause.247
b. Relevancy
The plaintiff has a right to inspect the books, records and income tax
returns of a defendant corporation so long as they are relevant 248 and material
to the counterclaim which has been asserted against him. The order of
inspection must limit such inspection to those matters which are relevant
to the specific issues raised by the claim. 249
Plaintiff sued in equity to have a lease, under which it had held an
aircraft, declared to be a loan arrangement infected with usury. The
defendant had retaken the aircraft for alleged nonpayment of rent. The
defendant counterclaimed for unpaid monthly rent and additional rent
based on the period of operation of the aircraft 250 and sought delivery of
various records, not for discovery, but for the use and operation of the
aircraft. It was held that the trial court did not have the power to compel
244. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12.
245. FLA. R. Civ. P. A.
246. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
247. Mack v. Mack, 115 So.2d 447 (Fla. App. 1959).
248. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 34.10, at 2458 (2d ed. 1950).
249. Cooper v. Fulton, 117 So.2d 33. (Fla. App. 1960). In a prior appeal pro-duction was held to be premature. Cooper v. Fulton, 107 So.2d 798 (Fla. App. 1959),
14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 260, 261 (1959). See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.18, at
1071 (2d ed. 1950).
250. Plaintiff's complaint was stricken for sham.
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production of records which were not relevant to the defendant's counter-
claim for rent. 2 1
In a companion case 252 the same provisions were involved relating to a
different aircraft. A similar equity complaint was also stricken as a sham,
leaving again only a legal counterclaim for rent. A similar motion to
require delivery of the records was filed by the defendants and was denied.
Thereafter the defendants moved for production of the documents and
records 253 involved in this case. The appellate court held that the order
of production must be restricted to include only those records and docu-
ments which revealed evidence of the period of the use of the aircraft for
the purposes of establishing the rental value.
One suing for injuries sustained when an allegedly defective restaurant
booth bench collapsed was entitled to production of photographs which
were in the possession of defendant's counsel or agent. Good cause was
shown since the bench had been repaired and the facts portrayed by the
photographs were not otherwise available. The record did not disclose any
circumstances which might contradict the alleged basis for disclosure.2 5 4
Although the work product doctrine was held to be applicable the court
found an exception to the nile.
6. REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON ORAL DEPOSITION -
WORK PRODUCT OF THE AGENT- CHARGE OF COSTS
The defendant upon oral deposition of the plaintiff's investigator
inquired as to photographs which had been taken by the investigator. The
deponent refused to answer certain questions on the ground that they
called for work product of the plaintiff's counsel and their employed investi-
gator. The questions, which he was subsequently ordered to answer, related
to reports and communications and the production of the same. On
appeal, held, reversed; some questions involved work product but other
questions relating to photographs of the scene of the accident were proper
questions and should have been answered. Therefore the refusal to answer
these latter questions subjected the plaintiffs to payment of reasonable
expense.255
251. Riddle Airlines, Inc. v. Mann, 123 So.2d 682 (Fla. App. 1960). "We do
not hold or imply that the appellees may not, in replevin or in some other proper action
or suit, seek a judgment or decree establishing in them a title or right to possession of
the records, relating to the aircraft now in their possesssion. And we express no view
on the merits of such an issue .... " Id. at 685.
252. Riddle Airlines, Inc. v. Mann, 123 So.2d 685 (Fla. App. 1960).
253. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
254. Pierson v. Scale, 128 So.2d 887 (Fla. App. 1961).
255. Goldstein v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 118 So.2d 253 (Fla. App. 1960).
[VOL. XVI
1962] CIVIL PROCEDURE 627
7. DEPOSITIONS DE 3ENE ESSE
By order of the court, effective October 1st, 1961, depositions de bene
esse are abolished. 25 6
K. Judgment on the Pleadings and Summary Judgment
1. JUDGMENT OR DECREE ON THE PLEADINGS
A motion for judgment or decree on the pleadings is not proper until
after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial.257
The pleadings are closed after an answer which contains no counterclaim
or cross-claim, unless the court orders a reply. 2581 If a counterclaim or cross-
claim is pleaded, or if the court orders a reply, the pleadings are not closed
until a reply or an answer to the cross-claim is served.259 A default judgment
and not a motion for judgment on the pleadings appears to be the correct
procedural remedy after a defendant has failed to file an answer,, or a
plaintiff has failed to file a reply to a counterclaim.
The Supreme Court of Florida has pointed out that the Florida rule on
judgment on the pleadings, unlike the federal rule, does not provide for the
interchangeability of a motion for judgment on the pleadings with a motion
for a summary judgment.260 This omission from our Florida rules has been
applied by two of our district courts of appeal, wherein it was held to have
been improper for the trial court, in ruling on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, to consider matter outside of the pleadings261
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
a. Introduction
Summary judgment is a device for terminating litigation short of trial
and avoiding a useless trial.262 Depending upon the facts and proofs it
may be granted upon all or part of 265 the controversy in litigation. The
256. 132 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1961).
257. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(c).
258. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a). See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.15, at 2268
(2d ed. 1961).
259. Ibid.
260. Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1956).
261. Davis v. Davis, 123 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 1960); Storer v. Florida Sportservice,
Inc., 115 So.2d 433 (Fla. App. 1959); Castner v. Ziemer, 113 So.2d 263 (Fla. App.
1959).
262. General Truck Sales, Inc. v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 100 So.2d 202 (Fla.
App. 1958). The trial judge is without authority to condition the entry or denial of a
summary judgment upon the condition that a party pay a mechanic's lien and file a bond.
Deauville Operating Corp. v. Town & Beach Plumbing Co., 123 So.2d 353 (Fla.
App. 1960).
263. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(c), (d) provide for an interlocutory summary judgment
on liability or partial summary judgment upon uncontroverted facts. Whittle v. Ellis,
122 So.2d 237 (Fla. App. 1960); Berry v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 121 So.2d 447 (Fla.
App. 1960),
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test for determining its propriety is twofold. First, is there a genuine
issue of a material fact? Giving every favorable inference 264 to the oppos-
ing party, if it appears from the pleadings, admissions, depositions, affidavits,
and/or interrogatories that there is or may be a genuine issue of material
fact the motion should be denied. Secondly, if there is no genuine issue
of material fact, is the moving party, or the nonmoving party,2 69 entitled
to judgment as a matter of law? The facts must be so clear that nothing
remains but a question of law. 266
b. Summary Judgment Prior to Answer
A motion for a summary judgment by a claimant may be made after
the expiration of twenty days from the commencement of the action or
after service of such a motion by the adverse party. 2 7 A defending party
may move for a summary judgment any time after the commencement of
the action. 268  In an action by a seller for goods allegedly bargained and
sold to the buyers, the buyers, before answering, moved for a summary
judgment.2 69  The trial court entered a summary judgment for the seller
and the buyer appealed. In reversing, the court stated:
In order to justify the entry of the summary judgment before
answer filed, it was necessary for the appellee (seller) to clearly
demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact could not be presented.
A consideration of the affidavits and pleadings leads to the infer-
ence that there are several possible legitimate defenses sufficient
to raise a genuine issue of a material fact which the appellants
(buyers) could or may interpose.270
In Lehew v. Larsen271 suit was brought to quiet title to property which
had been conveyed to the plaintiff by a tax deed. Prior to the filing of
an answer the defendant motioned to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. 27 2  Both parties moved for a summary final decree
and the plaintiff's motion was granted. The court reversed on appeal,
264. Schneider v. K. S. B. Realty & Inv. Corp., 128 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1961);
Smith v. City of Daytona Beach, 121 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1960); Majeske v. Palm
Beach Kennel Club, 117 So.2d 531 (Fla. App. 1959), curt. denied, 122 So.2d 408
(Fla. 1960); Groner-Youngerman, Inc. v. Denison, 117 So.2d'210, 215 (Fla. App. 1959).
265. Carpineta v. Shields, 70 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1954), 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 335 (1954).
266. Card v. Commercial Bank, 119 So.2d 404, 408 (Fla. App. 1960).
267. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a).
268. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(b).
269. The filing of a motion for summary judgment appears not to toll the time
for filing the answer in Florida. The federal position may differ. 6 MOORE, FEDERAt.
PRACTICE 56.08, at 2048 (2d ed. 1953).
270. Goldstein v. Florida Fisherman's Supply Co., 116 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. App.
1959). The court found that the affidavits raised issues of fact. Accord, Coast Cities
Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte, 130 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla. App. 1961).
271. 124 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1960).
272. The filing of the motion tolls the time for answer. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(a).
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holding that the defendant should have been afforded an opportunity to
file an answer as her affidavit showed that she might well have a defense.
The Florida position in this area is that a summary judgment should
not be granted before the defendant has answered unless it appears clear that
an issue of material fact cannot be presented. This is not to say or imply
that under proper circumstances a summary judgment may not be properly
granted prior to the filing of an answer.
c. Effect of Affirmative Defenses and Setoff'on
Plaintiff's Motion for a Summary Judgment
The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was supported with
evidentiary matter relating to matters dealt with in the complaint. The
defendant asserted affirmative defenses and setoff by way of answer. The
plaintiff was held not to be entitled to a summary judgment, even though
the defendant filed no matter in opposition, as it had not submitted
materials to show no genuine issue of material fact as against the defenses
and the setoff.273
d. Competent Evidence
Plaintiff's automobile and trailer turned over and crashed, allegedly
caused by the passing of the defendant's trailer-tractor unit. Summary
judgment on appeal was reversed; the deposition of the plaintiff raised a
genuine issue as to whether or not the passage proximately caused the
accident. Plaintiff's testimony was that the defendant's "trailer truck passed
me so close and so fast that it created such a suction that I thought that
the trailer was going to follow him .... -274
Though the court noted that only competent testimony may be con-
sidered in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment it was of the opinion
that it is an extremely close question as to whether it is of sufficient
competence and substance to justify a lawful inference by a jury that
the negligence of the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries . . . [wie think it more in the interest of the administra-
tion of justice and more in keeping with the rules governing the
entry of summary judgment to decline to enter a summary judg-
ment and to let the case go to a jury for its determination in its
wisdom of the factual issues. 275
In an automobile collision case, the plaintiff passenger sued the owner
of the other vehicle. Upon deposition and in affidavits the operator of
273. Emile v. First Nat'l Bank, 126 So.2d 305 (Fla. App. 1961), citing 6 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.17[41, at 2177 (2d ed. 1953).
274. Halavin v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 124 So.2d 746, 748 (Fla. App. 1960).
275. Id. at 749.
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the defendant's car stated she was driving properly and that the plaintiff's
operator failed to stop at the intersection. The operator of the plaintiff
passenger's automobile stated that he obeyed the stop sign. Plaintiff's
deposition stated that the operator of the vehicle in which she was a
passenger did not stop at the intersection. After these depositions and
affidavits were of record in support of and in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff obtained permission to file an amended com-
plaint which added as co-defendants the operators of both vehicles. The
defendants moved for and were granted a summary judgment. The plain-
tiff appealed, assigning as error only the entry of the summary judgment
in favor of the operator and owner of the other vehicle. The affidavit of
her operator, wherein he stated that he obeyed the stop sign, was the only
instrument offered by the plaintiff to offset the granting of the motion in
the trial court. This affidavit was in direct conflict with the plaintiff's
deposition wherein she testified that her operator did not stop at the
intersection. In affirming, the court held that a party could not change his
testimony on deposition by the use of an affidavit of one defendant against
another defendant in order to avoid a summary judgment.27 6
The Kramer v. Landau case, discussed above, was distinguished in
Pfeiffer v. Shonfeld.27 The Pfeiffers sued for personal injuries which
occurred as the result of a double rear end collision. The complaint alleged
that Mrs. Pfeiffer was injured when her vehicle was struck in the rear by
defendant Shonfeld. In the alternative, the compaint pleaded separate and
concurrent negligence of the two defendants. It was alleged that an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant Stover struck the rear of the Shonfeld
automobile at or about the same time as the Shonfeld automobile struck
the plaintiff's automobile. In reversing a summary judgment which had
been entered in favor of the defendant Stover, the court rejected his con-
tention that the cause should be treated as consisting of two separate and
independent causes of action and that as between the plaintiffs and defend-
ant Stover, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the testimony of the defendant
Shonfeld, because it is contrary to plaintiff wife's "impression" of how
the accident occurred. The plaintiffs were not barred from recovery by
the conclusion of the wife on oral deposition that the defendant Stover
was not responsible for the accident, where it did not appear that the
wife's testimony established nonliability of the defendant, and that the
statement relied upon was not based upon observation but a conclusion.
e. Impropriety of Summary Judgment on Trial
In advance of the trial defendant moved for a summary judgment.
276. Kramer v. Landau, 113 So.2d 756 (Fla. App. 1959).
277. 128 So.2d 6 (Ffa. App. 1961).
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Upon hearing, the motion was denied, with leave to renew it during the
trial if applicable. On trial by jury, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's
case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court entered
an order which recited that the defendant's motion for directed verdict
would be considered as a renewal of its motion for summary judgment, that
the court found no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendant
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The jury was dis-
charged, the final judgment was entered thereon for the defendant and the
plaintiff appealed. The judgment was reversed on appeal because a sum-
mary judgment is essentially pretrial in character and it is assumed that
the trial court based its decision only upon those matters which may be
properly considered in passing upon a summary judgment, viz., the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits. The appellate court noted that had the
defendant cross-assigned as error the trial court's failure to grant its directed
verdict, the appellate court could then have looked to the merits of the
motion.27 8
In a conversion action in which a jury trial was demanded, an inter-
locutory summary judgment as to liability was entered in favor of the
plaintiff.21 ° At the hearing after the order granting the interlocutory sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiff served and filed a motion "for final judgment."
The trial court erroneously heard testimony and entered final judgment in
a case where a jury had been demanded. On appeal it was reversed and
remanded for jury trial on the issue of damages.2 0  The plaintiff contended
that its motion was one for summary judgment as to the damages. The
appellate court rejected this contention because such procedure is not author-
ized in a litigated cause and the rules do not permit the taking of testimony
.in a hearing for a summary judgment. 281
f. Summary Judgment after Appellate Remand
The judgment for the plaintiff in an action against the railroad was
reversed on appeal because of the insufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict and judgment. 2 2  At pretrial conference upon remand, the
plaintiff announced that she had no additional evidence which could be
adduced on the second trial of her cause which would tend to establish
278. Fish Carburetor Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 125 So.2d 889 (Fla. App.
1961). Judge Barns compares a motion for directed verdict and motion for summary
judgment in \Warring v. WVinn-Dixie Stores, 105 So.2d 915 (Fla. App. 1958).
279. Ogden Trucking Co. v. Ieller Bros., 130 So.2d 295, 296 (Fla. App. 1961).
The interlocutory summary judgment was not assigned as error and therefore was not
reviewable.
280. 130 So.2d at 296.
281. The court, ciling to 6 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 56.11[8], at 2084 (2d
ed. 1953), noted flit the Florida position differs from the federal because Florida does
not have a rule comparable to FED. R. Civ. P. 43(e).
282. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Walker, 113 So.2d 420 (Fla. App. 1959).
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liability, or to establish her entitlement to the relief sought. The defendant
renewed its motion for summary judgment which was granted. On the
second appeal the trial court was affirmed; the court held that the plain-
tiff's admission established that there was no genuine issue of a material
fact to be determined by a jury and summary final judgment was therefore
proper.283  The crucial factor was the admission by counsel that he had no
additional testimony to present upon retrial.28 4
If the court denies the motion for summary judgment the order is not
reviewable until entry of a final judgment. In Riedel v. Driscol1285 the
appellate court reversed the judgment entered upon a verdict as being
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and found from the record
that the evidence overwhelmingly established contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff. On remand, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied. The defendant sought certiorari. The petition was
dismissed because the defendant had an adequate remedy by appeal after
final judgment to review the trial court's order denying its motion for sum-
mary judgment and the record did not reflect that the plaintiff could not
adduce new or additional evidence on the retrial of the case.2 86
g. Rehearing after Entry of Summary Judgment
After entry of summary judgment for the defendant in a malpractice
action, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended com-
plaint; the trial judge correctly ruled that he was without jurisdiction to
consider further amendment to the pleadings. In affirming, the court stated
"there appears to be no provision in the rules or any other basis of which
we are aware that permits the consideration of a motion in the nature of
a rehearing upon the entry of a summary judgment. 28 7
Effective July 1st, 1962, Rule 2.8, as amended, changes the principle
in law actions288 that rehearings on summary judgment are not available.
The amended rule provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or a part of the issues. On a motion for a rehearing of a summary
283. Walker v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 121 So.2d 713 (Fla. App. 1960).
284. In Riedel v. Driscoll, 127 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1961), the same district
court of appeal stated, "Had plaintiff's counsel in the Walker case not conceded at the
pre-trial conference that he had no further evidence to offer on the issue of liability, he
would have been entitled to resubmit his case to a jury at a subsequent trial."
285. 124 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1960).
286. Riedel v. Driscoll, 127 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1961).
287. Marins v. Stang, 124 So.2d 891 (Fla. App. 1960). Accord, Albert v. Carey,
120 So.2d 189 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1960).
288. Rehearing in suits in equity are controlled by FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16.
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judgment or of matters heard without a jury, the court may open
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony
and enter a new judgment.289
The rule goes on to provide that motion for rehearing shall be served not
later than ten days after the rendition of verdict or the entry of a summary
judgment.290
L. Relief from Judgment, Decrees or Orders
1. CLERICAL MISTAKES - CORRECTION
Errors in any part of the record are readily correctible at any time
either by the court on its own initiative or by motion and notice by any
party and as the court orders. In affirming a final decree which impressed
a trust upon certain property, the appellate court directed the chancellor
to correct the final decree which had, through oversight, failed to include
the granting of a divorce. 291
2. MISTAKES; INADVERTANCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT;
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC.
A sweeping procedural addition has been made to Florida law by the
amending of the rule on correction of judgment and decrees292 to include
relief from final judgment, decrees or orders. With the exception of the
omission of the residual clause,293 the Florida amended rule294 is substan-
tially the same as the federal rule.295
The addition reads as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
289. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(a), as amended, 139 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1962).
290. FA. R. Cv. P. 2.8(b), as amended, 139 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1962).
291. King v. King, 113 So.2d 242 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 5 (Fla.
1959); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38, now amended and numbered 1.38(a). This paragraph of
amended Rule 1.38 has been changed slightly. The second sentence formerly read: "During
the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is entered
." (Emphasis added.) The words "record on appeal is docketed" have been substituted
in lieu of the italicized phrase. 139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962). The federal counter-
part is contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a). See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.05-.08
(2d ed. 1953).
292. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38 in 3 FLA. STAT. 3599 (1961).
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) provides "or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation.of the judgment." See 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.27[1l], at
293 (2d ed. 1955).
294. FLA. R. Civ. 1.38, as amended, 139 So.2d 129, 130-31 (Fla. 1962).
295. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For a comprehensive discussion of the federal rule
see 6 & 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 60 (2d ed.).
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evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment or
decree is void; (5) the judgment or decree has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment or decree upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective appli-
cation. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after judg-
ment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or decree or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding, or to set
aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills
of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished,
and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment or
decree shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action. 29
M. Transfers of Actions Erroneously Begun
1. LAW AND EQUITY TRANSFERS
As long as Florida maintains two sides, equity and law, to its trial court
of general jurisdiction, the problem of which side of the court has jurisdic-
tion will continue to arise. The rules 297 seek to ameliorate the problems in
this area by providing for transfer of an action erroneously begun on either
the law or the equity side of the court to the proper side of the court.2;H
Transfer is the proper device and not dismissal when the cause is found
to be brought on the wrong side of the court.2 99
The plaintiff's complaint in chancery sought to establish an equitable
lien on the property, or in the alternative, for the sale of the property. The
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action was
296. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b), as amended, 139 So.2d 129, 130-31 (Fla. 1962).
297. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(a).
298. Adimi v. Pankonin, 126 So.2d 153 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 129 So.2d 141(Fla. 1961); Jamerson-Lawson Corp. v. Central State Dev. Corp., 121 So.2d 680 (Fla.
App. 1960); Dewing v. Nelson & Co., 117 So.2d 744 (Fla. App. 1960); Levene v. En-
chanted Lake Homes, Inc., 115 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1959); Bailey v. Bailey, 114 So.2d
804 (Fla. App. 1959). In Overstreet v. Lamb, 128 So.2d 897 (Fla. App. 1961) suit had
been properly brought in equity; transfer to law side reversed on appeal.
299. Dewing v. Nelson & Co., 117 So.2d 744 (Fla. App. 1960); Levene v. Enchanted
Lake Homes, Inc., 115 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1959); Cook v. Central & So. Fla. Flood
Control Dist., 114 So.2d 691 (Fla. App. 1959). Transfer to the law side is not available
where a complete defense to a lien is proven. One could not under such facts find that
the plaintiff misconceived his remedy. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Levin, 115
So.2d 423 (Fla. App. 1959).
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denied on the ground that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law and
the chancellor transferred the suit to the law side. In reversing the lower
court, it was held that the transfer to the law side should not have been
granted, without a clear holding that no cause of action in equity existed,
and without allowing the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.300
An action to recover money due on the purchase of goods was instituted
on the law side of the court. On jury trial the judge, sua sponte, declared
a mistrial and transferred the action to the equity docket upon the belief
that the action was too complicated for a jury. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the pleadings showed no statement of facts which would
render equity jurisdiction appropriate. Transfer is applicable only if it
appears that the action was commenced on the wrong side. It is not
sufficient to deny one his constitutional right to trial by jury because the
case is complicated and requires an elementary accounting on the part of
the jury.301
The plaintiff obtained a final decree permanently enjoining a number
of unions from engaging in a secondary boycott. The decree was reversed
on appeal because the evidence established that the unfair labor practice
had an effect on interstate commerce so as to preclude injunctive relief in a
state court and to confer jurisdiction on the National Labor Relations
Board. On rehearing the appellate court refused to transfer the tort com-
plaint 302 to the law side and stated that the reversal for want of jurisdic-
tion was without prejudice and would not preclude the plaintiff from
maintaining any right it may have to bring an action at law. The court
at this time would not rule on the question of jurisdiction of the state
court as to damages. 803
2. TRANSFER TO THE PROPER COURT WITHIN THE SAME COUNTY
A case may be transferred, if brought in the wrong court, to the proper
court within that county.304 A plaintiff, in a personal injury action, recov-
ered judgment for 1,200 dollars and costs. He then filed in the cause an
affidavit for writ of garnishment.30 On trial, at the conclusion of gar-
nishor's case, the trial judge, acting upon oral motion of the garnishee,
transferred the cause to the civil court of record because the amount in
controversy was less than 5,000 dollars.30 6 Certiorari was granted and the
300. Phelps v. Hiaeins. 120 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1960).
301. Rizzo v. Euclid Urbana Co., 118 So.2d 553 (Fla. App. 1960).
302. 29 U.S.C. 187 (1958).
303. International Hod Carriers' v. Heftier Constr. Co., 116 So.2d 30 (Fla. App.
1959).
304. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(b).
305. FLA. STAT. § 77.03 (1961).
306. The circuit court in Dade County has jurisdiction of law actions wherein the
amount in controversy is $5,000. The civil court of record has jurisdiction where the
amount is less than $5,000. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6; FLA. STAT. § 33.02 (1961).
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transfer was ordered quashed. The statutes provide for the procurement
of a writ of garnishment to be filed "in the court where such judgment has
been obtained .... ."801 The proceedings in garnishment were ancillary
to the final judgment rendered in the cause; therefore, the circuit court
had jurisdiction over the subject matter.308
II. ACTIONS AT LAW ONLY
A. Jury Trial - Waiver
The defendant's answer was stricken and a default entered against him
for failure to comply with a discovery order. Both parties had made
timely demands for trial by jury. The striking of the answer and the entry
of default did not obliterate his demand, nor could the plaintiff's demand
be withdrawn without the defendant's consent.809
Plaintiff sued his insurer to recover under a jewelry "floater" policy.
In a trial without a jury, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The
appellate court reversed on the ground that the trial judge had erroneously
refused to admit into evidence, for impeachment purposes, a prior written
statement and testimony on deposition of the plaintiff. The cause was
"remanded for trial to the judge unless on motion a trial to a jury is
awarded."110
B. Jury Instructions
A trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff's singular motion
for a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff's requested instructions
on last clear chance should have been given. The appellate court in affirm-
ing held that under the facts of the case the plaintiff was entitled to a last
clear chance instruction. The court pointed out that the trial judge has a
duty to charge on basic rules. A party desiring additional instructions is
under a duty to submit them.811 If a party fails to object to instructions
as given he can not obtain review of the charges on appeal.
812
307. Sup~ra note 305.
308. Goldenkoff v. General Acc. Fire & Assur. Corp., 116 So.2d 780 (Fla. App.
1960).
309. Grappell v. Lauderdale River Park Estates, 126 So.2d 574 (Fla. App. 1961).
"A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of the parties." FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.1(d).
310. Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 117 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. App. 1960). The
federal position generally is that a new trial does not revive the right to demand a jury
trial unless the trial court at its discretion grants relief from the waiver pursuant to the
FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b). 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.45, at 343-44 (2d ed. 1951).
311. Holdsworth v. Crews, 129 So.2d 153 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 135 So.2d 743
(Fla. 1961).
312. Jones v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 117 So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 1960). The applic-
able sentence of FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(b) reads: "No party may assign as error the giving
of any charge unless he objects thereto at such time . ... "
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C. Directed Verdict
1. RESERVED DIRECTED VERDICT (JUDGMENT N.O.V.)
AND THE RECORD
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued a city for damages for injury
of the wife from a fall in a swimming pool locker room. A verdict was
rendered for the plaintiffs, the defendant's post-trial motion for directed
verdict 18 was denied and final judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.
The defendant transcribed for appeal the testimony of only two witnesses.
The appellate court held that the appellant city failed to show that it
preserved its right to question the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
The record on appeal did not show (apparently the appellant city failed to
have it transcribed) that a motion for a directed verdict was made at the
close of the plaintiff's case and that the ruling was reserved thereon or
that a motion for a directed verdict was made at the close of all the evi-
dence.3 14 Therefore, the appellant could not support the assignment of
error as to the lower court's denial of its motion for directed verdict at the
close of all the evidence and post-verdict motion. The court held 815 that
the record also failed to show that a motion for a new trial had been made,
so the defendant could not question the sufficiency of the evidence under
the Ruth v. Sorensen case.816
2. RESERVED DIRECTED VERDICT ON REMANDED CASE
In a personal injury action wherein the court had directed a verdict
for the defendant at the close of the plaintiffs' case, it subsequently granted
the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. The order granting the new trial
was affirmed on appeal.8 17 Upon new trial the jury returned verdicts for
the plaintiffs; whereupon, the court ruled on the defendant's reserved
directed verdict motion, the court having reserved ruling on the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict which had been made at the close of all the
evidence, and directed the jury to find a verdict of not guilty in favor of
the defendant. The judgment entered thereon was reversed on appeal with
directions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment thereon for the
plaintiffs. It was held that having concluded in the first appeal that the trial
court was correct in granting a new trial, in that the evidence was suf-
ficient to take the issue of liability to the jury, this is a conclusion in
313. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(b).
314. 6551 Collins Ave. Corp. v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1958), 14 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 266-68 (1959).
315. City of Pompano Beach v. Edwards, 129 So.2d 144 (Fla. App. 1961).
316. 104 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1958).
317. 2500 Collins Corp. v. Geller, 104 So.2d 424 (Fla. App. 1958) (per curiam af-
firmance without opinion).
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the second trial where the evidence is substantially the same as that offered
at the first trial.31 8
3. MOTIONS FOR A RESERVEI) DIRECTED VERDICT AND,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NEW TRIAL
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant filed a
motion in accordance with its prior motion for directed verdict or, in the
alternative, a motion for a new trial.31 9 An order was entered granting a
motion for judgment for the defendant and that in the event of the judgment
being reversed on appeal, the alternative motion for a new trial to" be
granted. The basis of the order was indicated to be that error had been
committed in charging the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance and
that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
appellate court found that the record supported the application of the last
clear chance doctrine and the verdict; it was error to enter judgment for
the defendant.
As to the propriety of ruling on both motions in the alternative the
court said:
Although the language of Rule 2.7, Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 31 F.S.A., indicates that the trial court may set aside a
jury verdict by either granting the renewed motion for a directed
verdict or granting the motion for new trial, but not both, an
examination of Official Form Six which was promulgated by the
Florida Supreme Court for use by the Bar in conjunction with
Rule 2.7, and the decisions of the Federal Courts under Rule 50,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., which is similar
to our Rule 2.7, leads us to the conclusion that the trial court was
correct in ruling upon both motions in the alternative manner
described above. 20
Turning then to reviewing the order granting a new trial, the court found
no abuse of discretion. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded
for a new trial.3 21
The next question which arises is what results when the trial court
does not rule upon an alternative motion for a new trial. In a Federal
Employers' Liability Act case the defendant filed a post-trial motion for a
reserved directed verdict, seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and in the alternative a new trial. The trial judge granted the former
motion and judgment was entered for the defendant. The trial court did
318. Geller v. 2500 Collins Corp., 130 So.2d 322 (Fla. App. 1961).
319. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(c).
320. King v. Jacksonville Coach Co., 122 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla. App. 1960).
321. Ibid.
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not rule on the defendant's alternative motion for a new trial. On appeal
the judgment for the defendant was reversed as the evidence supported
the jury verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate court remanded the
cause for a ruling by the trial court on the defendant's motion for new
trial and added: "this court is only saying 'Good Bye,' it is not neces-
sarily 'Forever, fare thee well.' "322
D. New Trial
1. DISPROPORTIONED VERDICT NOT GROUNDS
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, appealed from an order which
granted the defendant's motion for new trial on the issue of damages.
The court granted the new trial on the ground that the verdicts were dispro-
portionate. The jury awarded the wife 2,500 dollars and the husband
2,300 dollars. In reversing, the appellate court held that where separate
and distinct causes of action could have been maintained separately, the
trial court does not have the power to set aside verdicts because in its
opinion the verdicts cannot be reconciled. 23
2. IMPROPER TESTIMONY
In a head-on collision case a patrolman testified that, based upon the
debris, oil and dirt on the highway, the collision occurred at a certain point.
The defendant objected on the ground that the patrolman was not an ex-
pert. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for new trial. The order for new trial was
affirmed on appeal.8 24 The appellate court found no material conflict be-
tween the basis for the objection by the defendant to the evidence and the
ground asserted for the new trial. If such a conflict existed it would not be
of importance because "a trial court may grant a new trial on its own initia-
tive for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on a
motion of a party. '825
3. NEW TRIAL MOTION NOT PREREQUISITE FOR REVIEW
OF JUDGMENT ON DIRECTED VERDICT
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued for injuries allegedly resulting
from the negligence of the defendant. The trial judge granted the defend-
ant's motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. On
appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to the directed verdict the
defendant moved to quash the appeal, contending that the plaintiffs had
322. McCloskey v. Louisville & N.R.R., 122 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla. App. 1960).
323. Carter v. Duval Eng'r & Contracting Co., 128 So.2d 143 (Fla. App. 1961).
324. Mills v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 127 So.2d 453 (Fla. App. 1961).
325. Id. at 457; FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(d).
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not adequately preserved the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
for review because they did not motion for a new trial. The appellate
court held:
[T]he ruling of a trial judge directing a verdict for a defendant on
the ground of the legal insufficiency of the evidence presented
by the plaintiff is reviewable by the appellate court as a matter of
law without the necessity of the presentation and disposition of
a motion for a new trial by the offended party.3 20
4. NEW TRIAL ORDER MUST STATE GROUNDS
The rules require that an order for a new trial must state the grounds
upon which the motion is granted.3 27 In Fulton v. Poston Bridge & Iron,
Inc.,321 the court directed a verdict for the defendants. Subsequently the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. The defendants as-
signed as error the failure of the order for new trial to state the grounds.
A month after the appeal was taken the trial judge, on plaintiffs' motion,
entered an order amending and clarifying the initial order. Though sympa-
thizing with the plaintiffs, the appellate court pointed out that it is the
duty of counsel as well as the court to see that the order is in proper
form and content and to make timely application to the trial judge, prior
to the filing of the notice of appeal, to rectify the deficient order.
29
Where an order for a new trial does not state the grounds, Florida
counsel might be advised to proceed under Rule 1.38(a) and motion the
court to correct the oversight. This rule provides for the correction of
oversights and omissions "during the pendency of an appeal ...before
the record on appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
court."
3 3 0
5. NEW TRIAL RULE AMENDED
Substantial changes have been made in the rle granting new trials.381
Rehearing on summary judgment is now available 332 and it may be that
326. Furr v. Gulf Exhibition Corp., 114 So.2d 27, 29 (Fla. App. 1959), aff'd mem.,
116 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1959).
327. Formerly FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(d), now 2.8(f). In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139 So.2d
129, 131 (Fla. 1962). See also FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1961).
328. 122 So.2d 240 (Fla. App. 1960).
329. Accord, Gaskill v. Montague, 128 So.2d 420 (Fla. App. 1961); Bach v. Miami
Transit Co., 129 So.2d 706 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1961). The
federal practice requires that the order for a new trial state the grounds only if the motion
is court initiated. If made by a party, perusal 'of the motioil will show the -grounds. 6
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.11, at 3873 (2d ed. 1953).
330. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139 So.2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1962).
331. Id. at 131.
332. See text supra note 289.
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rehearing of any judgment is available.3 33 The amended rules specifically
provide for the mode and time of serving affidavits in support or in opposi-
tion to a motion for a new trial.33 4  The reader's attention is directed to
a careful analysis of the new amendments.
III. EQUITY Surrs ONLY
A. Class Actions
The requirements of a class action335 were held to have been met
in a declaratory decree336 suit against the City of Miami. The plaintiffs
in behalf of themselves and others in like situations who paid fines to
the City of Miami for traffic violations after the Metropolitan Courts
took over were held to have a common interest *and to represent a class
so numerous that it would be impracticable to join all complainants.33 7
B. When Cause At Issue
In a suit to enjoin the defendants from selling alcoholic beverages on
certain properties, the defendants filed motions to dismiss, to strike, and
for a more definite statement. The motions were argued but no ruling
made thereon. The defendants answered and testimony was taken, after
which the chancellor entered a decree for the plaintiffs. The rule provides:
"If, however, within such period of 20 days a motion permitted by these
rules is served, the cause shall not be deemed at issue until the points of
law so presented shall be ruled upon by the court. ' '33 s The appellate court
held that the entry of the final decree in favor of the plaintiffs was equiv-
alent to denial of the motions,339 and upheld the restrictive covenant.340
The ruling regulating the time for the taking of testimonys41 was
333. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(a), as amended by 139 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1962). "On
a motion for a rehearing . . .of matters heard without a jury, the court may open the
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony and enter a new judgment."
FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(b), as amended by 139 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1962), specifies the
time for motion and includes "or rehearing of any motion for judgment provided for by
these rules."
334. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(c) (1954), as amended by 139 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla.
1962).
335. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.6.
336. FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1961).
337. City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1959). On the merits the
supreme court held that the plaintiffs were barred from recovery.
338. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.8.
339. See Tropicaire Eng'r Serv. Corp. v. Chrysler Airtemp Sales Corp., 97 So.2d 149
(Fla. App. 1957), discussed in 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 270-71 (1959), as to order post-
poning a ruling on motion until final hearing.
340. Hevia v. Palm Terrace Fruit Co., 119 So.2d 795 (Fla. App. 1960).
341. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.13 in 3 FLA. STAT. 3491 (1959). This rule was derived
from Rule 69 of Federal Equity Rules of 1842, 17 Peters lxxiii, and was adopted in Florida
by the Fla. Equity Rules in 1873. Equity Rule 69 was abolished by adoption of the
Federal Equity Rules of 1912, 48 years ago, after 70 years of experience. See HoPKINs,
FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 157 (8th ed. 1933).
1962]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
abolished by court order on June 30, 1961342 and is no longer applicable
to suits commenced on or after October 1st, 1961.348
C. interpleader
Interpleader in Florida has been regulated by case law and has suffered
by historical technicalities and prerequisites.84 4 As of July 1st, 1962 the
remedy has been liberated . 45 Henceforth, the Florida practice in this
area will be substantially the same as the federal practice. 46 Judicial inter-
pretation of the comparable federal rule will be valuable to the Florida
practitioner.8 47
D. Masters
In an action for a dissolution of a partnership the plaintiff on appeal
assigned certain procedural rulings as error. After the chancellor determined
that the plaintiff was entitled to some relief he ordered the cause referred
to a special master.3 48 The plaintiff made no objection to the form of the
order until after the special master filed his report. The appellate court
found it apparent that this special master did not proceed in accord with
Rule 3.14(f), which provides that it shall be the duty of the master to
assign a time and place for proceeding and give notice of same. The court
held that the plaintiff's assignment of error to this effect failed as the
plaintiff did not avail himself of the Form of Accounts rnle,' 49 which permits
a dissatisfied party to an accounting before a master to examine the ac-
counting party orally, or upon interrogatories, or by deposition, as the
master shall direct. The court held, inter alia:
The order of reference did not direct the taking of testimony
and because the appellant [plaintiff] did not object to the form
of the reference nor avail himself of the proceedings provided
by the rules, he cannot now be heard to object to a proceeding
in which the special master limited his activity to an examination
of the books and records which were presented to him.38 0
After the master has filed his report and given notice of same to
342. In re Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P., 131 So.2d 475, 476 (Fla. 1961).343. In re Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P., 132 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1961).
344. Maloney, Interpleader in Florida, 29 Fla. B. J. 128 (1955).
345. In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139 So.2d 129, 131-32 (Fla. 1962). Rule 3.13 now
covers "Interpleader." This rule number formerly covered "time for taking testimony";
see notes 341 and 342 supra.
346. FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
347. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 22.04, at 3007-13 (2d ed. 1948).
348. Pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.14(b).
349. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.14(h).
350. Obel v. Henshaw, 130 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla. App. 1961).
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counsel, the parties have ten days within which to file exceptions thereto.
This time may be enlarged by the court for good cause shown. If the
hearing is ex parte a recent amendment provides that: "Any such order
entered as a result of an ex parte hearing shall not become effective until
it has been served on opposing counsel and proof of service thereof has
been filed in the cause."351
E. Rehearing
In a divorce action the husband's counterclaim for divorce and child
custody prevailed. Alimony was awarded to the wife. Ten days after the
entry of the final decree the wife's petition for a rehearing regarding the
custody of the children was granted. The rehearing was limited to the
custody matter; no new evidence was presented on the issue of alimony.
The chancellor entered an amended decree which included a substantially
different provision for alimony and the wife appealed. The appellate court
found that no error had been committed in altering the alimony provision
after the rehearing without reception of additional evidence thereon.352
A petition for a rehearing does not stay the proceedings unless so
ordered by the court.353 In Ginsberg v. Ginsberg35 4 the husband in a
divorce suit contended that the contempt order could not be made properly
on a rule to show cause which had been entered while his petition for
rehearing addressed to the final decree remained on file and undisposed
of. It was held that the pendency of the petition for rehearing signifies
the continuance of the litigation for certain purposes and that it does
not operate as a stay of the decree or order to which it is addressed, unless
so ordered by the chancellor. In this suit no such order was made and
the pendency of the petition for rehearing did not relieve the defendant
of the obligation to make the payments required by the decree.
An undisposed of petition for rehearing does not preclude the movant
from appealing from the final decree. An appellant filed a petition for
rehearing of the final decree. Prior to a hearing on the petition the appel-
lant appealed. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal. The appellate
court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the appellant had
voluntarily abandoned his petition to the lower court by filing his notice
of appeal.315
351. In re Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P.. 131 So.2d 475, 476 (Fla. 1961); In re
Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P., 132 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1961).
352. Cole v. Cole, 130 So.2d 126 (Fla. App.), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 135
So.2d 714 (Fla. 1961).
353. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16(b).
354. 122 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1960).
355. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 114 So.2d 329 (Fla, App. 1959).
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F. Injunctions
Generally notice and bond are prerequisites for the granting of an
injunction. A county and its appropriate department administrators ap-
pealed from the granting of a restraining order which enjoined the defend-
ant Building and Zoning Department and its directing officials from
enforcing against the plaintiff, a swimming pool contractor, any pending
violation notices and enjoined the enforcement of penalties for future vio-
lations. The order was issued without notice and without bond. In rever-
sing, 56 the appellate court found no facts sufficient in the complaint to
warrant the dispensing with notice3 57 or excusing the posting of a bond.
3 18
356. Metropolitan Dade County v. Polk Pools, Inc., 124 So.2d 737 (Fla. App. 1960).
357. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.19; FLA. STAT. § 64.02 (1961).
358. FLA. STAT. § 64.03 (1961). Accord, Belk's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Scherman, 117
So.2d 845 (Fla, App. 1960).
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